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Abstract
The mean time between failure (MTBF) of large supercomputers is decreasing, and
future exascale computers are expected to have a MTBF of around 30 minutes.
Therefore, it is urgent to prepare important algorithms for future machines with
such a short MTBF. Eigenvalue problems (EVP) and singular value problems (SVP)
are common in engineering and scientific research. Solving EVP and SVP numerically
involves two-sided matrix factorizations: the Hessenberg reduction, the tridiagonal
reduction, and the bidiagonal reduction. These three factorizations are computation
intensive, and have long running times. They are prone to suffer from computer
failures.
We designed algorithm-based fault tolerant (ABFT) algorithms for the parallel
Hessenberg reduction and the parallel tridiagonal reduction. The ABFT algorithms
target fail-stop errors. These two fault tolerant algorithms use a combination of
ABFT and diskless checkpointing. ABFT is used to protect frequently modified data
. We carefully design the ABFT algorithm so the checksums are valid at the end of
each iterative cycle. Diskless checkpointing is used for rarely modified data. These
checkpoints are in the form of checksums, which are small in size, so the time and
storage cost to store them in main memory is small. Also, there are intermediate
results which need to be protected for a short time window. We store a copy of this
data on the neighboring process in the process grid.
We also designed algorithm-based fault tolerant algorithms for the CPU-GPU

vii

hybrid Hessenberg reduction algorithm and the CPU-GPU hybrid bidiagonal reduction algorithm. These two fault tolerant algorithms target silent errors. Our design
employs both ABFT and diskless checkpointing to provide data redundancy. The low
cost error detection uses two dot products and an equality test. The recovery protocol
uses reverse computation to roll back the state of the matrix to a point where it is
easy to locate and correct errors.
We provided theoretical analysis and experimental verification on the correctness
and efficiency of our fault tolerant algorithm design. We also provided mathematical
proof on the numerical stability of the factorization results after fault recovery.
Experimental results corroborate with the mathematical proof that the impact is
mild.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mainstream supercomputers are well into the peta-scale era, with the number of
components sharply increasing in recent years. Early supercomputers relied on a
small number of specially designed powerful processors, and the first supercomputer,
the CDC 6600, had only one CPU. As the designer of CDC 6600 put it, “If you were
plowing a field, which would you rather use: Two strong oxen or 1024 chickens?”
That configuration was typical and lasted into the 1990s, when massively parallel
supercomputers became dominant. Massively parallel supercomputers usually contain
tens of thousands of commodity microprocessors. These thousands of processors are
connected by fast interconnects for data communication. Modern supercomputers are
now also equipped with accelerators, which are specialized in data parallel work loads.
Tianhe-2 (at National Supercomputer Center, Guangzhou, China), the number one
machine on the June 2015 TOP500 list [69], has 3,120,000 cores at its disposal. The
increase in the number of components is likely to continue [31], in which case even
the most optimistic predictions about the failure rate of a particular component, in
terms of tens of years, depicts a gloomy future. A future where the Mean Time To
Interrupt (MTTI) of the entire machine falls under a few hours, drastically affecting
individual applications running on the system [80], with a lasting impact, not only
on the scientific throughput, but directly on the cost of the scientific simulations.
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Various techniques to recover from a process failure exist, encompassing completely automatic solutions such as Checkpoint/Restart (C/R) and algorithm-level
techniques such as Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT). All of these methods are
applicable to linear algebra computations, and each has its advantages and drawbacks.
The major advantage of the C/R approach is the generality: it can be applied to a
wide range of applications — not just linear algebra software. The major drawback
of C/R is its relatively high overhead. The advantage of the ABFT techniques is
the potential lower overheads, in exchange for algorithmic alterations. The major
disadvantage of the ABFT technique is that it can only be applied to protect numerical
software.
In this dissertation, we explore methods to provide fault resilience for two-sided
dense matrix factorizations, namely the Hessenberg reduction, tridiagonal reduction,
and bidiagonal reduction. The Hessenberg reduction [85] is an important step in
calculating the eigenvalues and/or eigenvectors of a dense non-symmetric matrix or
for solving the regular generalized eigenvalue problem. The tridiagonal reduction is
used in solving the eigenvalue problem of a dense symmetric matrix. The bidiagonal
reduction is used in solving the singular value problem of a general dense matrix.
The common characteristics of these three factorizations are that their computation
complexity is high, and they are rich in level 2 BLAS operations.

These two

characteristics result in long running times. The longer the running time is, the
more likely a component will fail during the execution. Once a failure strikes, the
application cannot continue because of data loss. The application has to start over
from the beginning, and all associated cost (machine time and electricity) is wasted.
We developed algorithms to enable fault resilience for these two-sided dense matrix
factorization algorithms. Our goal is to achieve fault tolerance with less overhead than
the widely used C/R approach. We also envision a version for soft error resilience of
the two-side matrix factorizations for CPU-GPU hybrid version.

2

1.1

Problem Statement

In this dissertation we consider two different kinds of errors in two-sided dense matrix
factorizations: hard errors and soft errors. We define hard errors as process failures.
When a hard error occurs a process is lost, the associate data is also gone. The
factorization cannot continue in the case of hard errors because the data is incomplete.
Soft errors are bit-flips in the factorization data. When a soft error occurs, a bit in
the factorization data is flipped, and the factorization keeps running only to produce
wrong results. Soft errors are more dangerous because if the application does not
actively detect them and correct them, they will not be noticed.

1.2

Contribution

The contribution of this dissertation consists of two major parts: fault tolerance
algorithms for hard errors and fault tolerance algorithms for soft errors. We designed
the fault tolerance algorithms which combine the advantages of ABFT and disckless
checkpointing. ABFT is used to protect the frequently modified data, which greatly
reduces the overhead when compared to checkpointing. For the part of the data that
is rarely modified, we use diskless checkpointing to provide protection.

1.2.1

Hard Errors

• Pseudo column checksums for the panel. Data in the original input matrix
is protected by checksums. The checksum blocks at the bottom of the global
matrix are called pseudo column checksums. If the global matrix is distributed
over a P × Q process grid in a 2D block cyclic fashion, these checksum blocks
on the bottom are calculated assuming the block column is distributed over
Q processors instead of P processors. This is why the column checksums are
called “pseudo” checksums. Pseudo checksums are needed in order to maintain
the validity of the checksum blocks on the right side of the global input matrix.
3

The checksum blocks on the right side are the data redundancy used to recover
from a failure later on.
• Diskless checkpointing for the panel factorization result.

In the

two-sided matrix factorizations, the intermediate matrices resulting from the
panel factorization cannot be recomputed as they are in the one-sided matrix
factorizations. The reason is that the panel factorization has data dependency
on the trailing matrix. Any changes in the trailing matrix after the panel
factorization will make it impossible to recompute the panel factorization. We
use diskless checkpointing to protect the panel factorization results. Diskless
checkpoints are stored in the neighboring process to the right.
• Use the built in data redundancy in the parallel tridiagonal reduction.
The parallel tridiagonal reduction algorithm takes advantage of the symmetry
of the matrix to save floating point operations by only performing updates on
the lower triangular part of the trailing matrix. The upper triangular part of the
global matrix is not accessed throughout the factorization, but the checksums
on the right side of the global matrix encodes the full matrix. Once a failure
occurs, we fill the necessary matrix blocks in the upper triangular part using
matrix blocks from the lower triangular part. We are able to do this because of
the symmetry of the trailing matrix.
• Formal and experimental performance analysis. We provide a thorough
examination of the theoretical computation complexity of the fault tolerant
algorithms.

We calculate the number of extra floating point operations

(FLOPS) incurred by the fault tolerant algorithms, and we compare the
extra FLOPS with the FLOPS of the original algorithms.

We also verify

the theoretical analysis through experiments. We also evaluate the numerical
stability of our fault tolerant algorithms.
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1.2.2

Soft Errors

• Low cost error detection. We append a row of column checksums at the
bottom of the input matrix, and a column of row checksums at the right
side of the input matrix. The checksum row and the checksum column are
maintained through computation, so they are valid at the end of each iteration.
The mathematical operations required to maintain the checksums are the same
operations used in updating the trailing matrix, and they can be combined to
take advantage of the optimized computation kernels. Error detection can be
achieved by comparing the sum of the checksum row elements and the sum of
the checksum column elements at the end of each iteration. The extra FLOPS
needed by the error check is O(n) in each iteration, whereas the computation
complexity of the original algorithm is O(n3 ).
• Reverse computation. After an error is detected, our algorithm reverses the
computation to the state at the end of the last iteration. The state at the end of
the last iteration is a clean state which means the checksums on the right of the
matrix and the checksums on the bottom of the matrix are valid checksums. At
this state we can use the checksums to locate and correct the error. Rolling back
the application data through computation is preferable because computation is
much faster than using checkpoints.
• Modified panel factorization kernel. The panel factorization kernel takes
a block column as input, factorizes the block column to the desired form
(tridiagonal, bidiagonal, or Hessenberg form), and then returns the Householder
vectors used in the factorization. The group of Householder vectors are used to
update the trailing matrix. In order to maintain the validity of the checksums
on the right, we need checksums of the Householder vectors. These checksums
can be generated separately after the panel factorization has finished, but this
adds more tasks on the critical path of the algorithm, and will have more effects
in slowing down the factorization. We fuse the checksum generation with the
5

panel factorization so that minimum time penalty is incurred due to generating
these checksums.

1.3

Dissertation Outline

The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 introduces the background and related work on different types of fault
tolerance technologies. This chapter also presents related fault tolerance work on
dense linear algebra, and two-sided dense matrix factorizations in particular. Chapter 3 presents the hard error resilient parallel Hessenberg reduction algorithm. The
fault tolerant algorithm combines the strengths of ABFT and diskless checkpointing
to achieve fault tolerance against hard errors with low performance penalty. Chapter 4
describes the hard error resilient parallel tridiagonal reduction algorithm. This fault
tolerant algorithm also uses diskless checkpointing and ABFT to protect the matrix
data. In addition, this fault tolerant algorithm uses the symmetry of the matrix to
retrieve data from the lower triangular part of the matrix in the recovery protocol.
Chapter 5 describes the fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm for soft errors
on CPU-GPU hybrid platforms. Chapter 6 describes the fault tolerant bidiagonal
reduction algorithm for soft errors on CPU-GPU hybrid platforms. Finally Chapter 7
concludes the dissertation and outlines future directions.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we review studies on the impact of faults in high performance
computing and common technologies to mitigate the impact of faults on applications.

2.1

Impact of Faults

Faults and component failures have been unavoidable since the birth of computers.
The impact of computer faults is so significant that companies exist that focus
solely on manufacturing fault-tolerant computers. Avizienis and Laprie [3] proposed
taxonomy in an effort to facilitate easy communication on dependable computing.
They define failure/error as the deviation of the actual service state from the correct
service state. The cause of a failure/error is called a fault.
Faults can be rooted in hardware malfunctions or software issues. Hardware may
have hidden defects that are not detected in the manufacturing process, and these
defects or bugs manifest as faults after installation. Hardware faults can also be
caused by aging of components. Another source of hardware faults is cosmic rays.
In fact, cosmic rays were shown to be the most prevalent sources of transient errors.
Transient errors may happen at different levels in the hardware hierarchy, such as
communication links or digital logic, but transient errors occur most commonly in
the semiconductor storage. Software faults, on the other hand, can be caused by
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bugs. As much as programmers want to write their software correctly, there are
always bugs left behind. Parallel software is especially difficult to debug. If the bug
is in system software and the bug causes the system to provide incorrect service to
application codes, these bugs are considered as faults.
Faults can be categorized as hard faults and soft faults based on their effects. If
the fault causes the program to abort or hang, this fault is called a fail-stop fault, or
hard fault. If a fault is transient and goes unrecognized by the runtime, this fault is
called a fail-continue fault, or transient fault/soft fault. Hard faults can cause huge
waste of computing resources on peta-scale machines or future exa-scale machines.
If an application has been running on a large portion of a peta-scale machine for a
prolonged time period, then a hard fault could trash all the computation leading up
to the fault, resulting in the aforementioned waste. Hard faults can also prevent large
applications from ever completing their tasks on future exa-scale machines. The mean
time between failure (MTBF) of an exa-scale machine is expected to be around 30
minutes, which means jobs which take more than 30 minutes to complete may never
actually finish. Compared to hard errors, soft errors are more dangerous and more
catastrophic, because soft errors can cause incorrect numerical results and there is
no way to confirm the correctness of the results if the results fall within the allowed
range. Soft errors could also corrupt memory address pointers and control flow of
applications, which in turn cause the application to crash or hang.

2.2

Existing technologies

Significant research efforts have been leveraged towards overcoming the impact of
faults in high end computing. Several practical fault-tolerance technologies have
been developed and provide satisfactory results on current peta-scale supercomputers.
Some of these fault tolerance technologies tackle the problem using a hardware
approach, and some tackle the problem using a software approach.

8

2.2.1

Hardware Duplication

A natural way to tolerate hardware failures is to use hardware redundancy. Hardware
redundancy can be divided into two categories: passive hardware redundancy and
active hardware redundancy (also known as dynamic hardware redundancy). Passive
hardware redundancy is also called static hardware redundancy. Examples of passive
hardware redundancy include NMR (N-Modular Redundancy) and TMR (Triple
Modular Redundancy). TMR is a special case of NMR. In TMR, the same program
is executed by three independent modules. Once every module obtains the result,
they carry out a vote, the majority wins, and the final result is obtained. TMR
was first implemented in the SAPO computer in Czechoslovakia [78, p.97]. TMR
circuits were also used in the Launch Vehicle Digital Computer in the Saturn IB
and Saturn V boosters. In Active hardware redundancy, only one unit of all the
redundant units is running. If the running unit fails, a backup will take over and the
faulty unit stops running. STAR (Self Testing And Repair), designed by Avizienis,
is one example of a computer based on active hardware redundancy [78, p.97].
STAR implements hardware redundancy in a different way. Every component in
STAR has several backup units, and at any given time only one unit is powered
and working. STAR executes each piece of program twice to detect component
failures; if a failure is detected, then the failed component is replaced by a backup
component. Once swapped out, the failed component is powered off to save energy.
This is desirable because STAR is designed for spacecraft where electricity is a scarce
resource. Hardware replication is an effective method to increase the MTBF (mean
time between failure) of the entire system, but the financial cost of the system also
increases proportionally with the number of backup units. This makes the hardware
redundancy approach impractical even for current peta-scale machines. Current top
end supercomputers typically have tens of thousands of compute nodes, and hundreds
of thousands of processors, which requires a huge financial investment, and using TMR
for fault tolerance would triple the already high cost of the machines. Therefore, TMR
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is typically used in small or special purpose computers such as the computer systems
on spacecraft as mentioned before.

2.2.2

ECC

ECC (Error Correcting Code) is a method to protect data read from the memory or
transmission bus. After data are written into memory, several factors can flip bits in
the data. This kind of bit flip often occurs in main memory which is made of DRAM
(Dynamic random-access memory). DRAM stores every bit in a capacitor, which itself
has two states: charged or discharged. These two states can be used to represent the
only two values in the binary computer world. Moore’s law also applies to DRAM.
As technology advances, the density of capacitors on the DRAM die becomes higher
and higher, while at the same time the feature size of the capacitors becomes smaller
and smaller. The charge capacity of individual capacitors therefore decreases, which
makes it easier for external charges to change the state of the capacitors. As a result,
measures must be taken to protect data stored in DRAM from being corrupted.
This is where ECC comes into the play. ECC works by using some extra bits to
provide data redundancy for individual words. These extra bits are calculated using
a coding algorithm. The most common error correcting code is SECDED (single-error
correction and double-error detection) Hamming code. As the name indicates, this
code is able to correct a single bit corruption and detect a double-bit corruption.
Another common SECDED code is the Hsiao code [53]. When data are written to
the DRAM, ECC calculates the redundant bits and stores them also in the DRAM.
When data stored in the DRAM are requested, the redundant bits are calculated
again, and the newly generated bits are compared to the redundant bits stored in
the DRAM. If there is a mismatch between these two copies of redundant bits, there
are corrupted bits in the codeword, which is the requested data. ECC can continue
to correct the error if there is only one bit corrupted. More advanced forms of ECC
exists. Chipkill [29] is IBM’s trademarked ECC technology. Chipkill uses a RAID-like
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approach to protect data stored in main memory. In Chipkill, the redundant bits are
not calculated based on a codeword on a single chip, but instead Chipkill references
bits from different DRAM chips. If a bit in one DRAM chip gets corrupted, only
one bit in the ECC codeword is corrupted. ECC is able to recover from this error.
In a much worse scenario, if an entire DRAM chip is corrupted, we get a group of
corrupted ECC codewords, but still only one bit in every ECC codeword is corrupted.
ECC is still be able to recover from this DRAM chip failure. Sun Microsystems has a
similar technology called Extended ECC, and HP also has a similar technology named
Advanced ECC. In rare cases, ECC is used to protect the data bus [2].

2.2.3

Software Duplication

Software duplication is another natural way to provide resilience to failures. In
software duplication, the program being executed is duplicated. In practice there
are various ways to implement software duplication. The most naive approach is to
run two instances of the same program without any modification to the code. When
one instance fails, the other one will hopefully run to completion. This approach
requires the least effort from the programmer, and is applicable to any existing code.
However, this approach clearly only tolerates one fail-stop error. If the running time of
the application is longer than twice of the MTBF of the machine, the application still
will not be able to run to completion. More advanced forms of software duplication
include process level duplication and thread level duplication. Both of these two
approaches require modifications to existing legacy codes. Process level duplication
runs two instances of each process in the application. If one process fails due to an
external influence, the application can keep running because the remaining instance
of the same process has all the necessary data. Moreover, the failed instance can be
recovered by cloning the remaining live process. Now that redundancy is resumed, the
application can tolerate the next fail-stop failure. Besides fail-stop failures, process
level duplication can be used to detect soft errors. Since there are two instances of
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the same process running, two copies of data exist in these two instances. These
two copies of data can be compared periodically, and mismatches between the two
copies of data indicate that soft errors have occurred. For this soft error detection
functionality to work, the application has to be bitwise reproducible. RedMPI [44]
is a library that performs duplicate executions of MPI applications transparently
to the programmer. RedMPI is a layer between the MPI application and the MPI
library. MPI calls made in the application are intercepted and handled by RedMPI.
RedMPI duplicates the call and then calls functions in the MPI library to carry out
the actual MPI operations. RedMPI can detect soft errors by comparing the two
copies of messages. By doing this all soft errors in the transmitted messages can be
caught, and presumably soft errors in the application data can be caught because soft
errors in the data owned by the MPI process will eventually manifest themselves in
the MPI messages.

2.2.4

Checkpoint Restart

While other methods for fail/stop errors exist, checkpoint restart is still the most
mature and reliable choice for production computer systems. The general idea of
Checkpoint/Restart is to store the application state to stable memory at a time
interval.

The time interval is a parameter supplied by the user.

In case of a

fail stop error, the data stored on reliable memory persists. The application can
restart itself, read its last saved state from reliable memory, and continue from there.
Checkpoint/Restart can be implemented at different levels in the software stack.
System level checkpointing [42] is performed at the operating system level, where the
operating system periodically saves the application states to reliable memory. The
operating system is oblivious to the progress of the application, so the points at which
the checkpoints are saved may not be optimal in that the amount of data saved may
exceed the amount necessary to recover from a failure. The advantage of system level
checkpointing is that it is transparent to users, meaning that it requires no effort from
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the programmer. If system level checkpointing is enabled, any code running on the
system will be protected by Checkpoint/Restart automatically. However, most of the
time system level Checkpoint/Restart is not optimal since the operating system does
not have knowledge of the application state. The operating system cannot choose
the best time point to save the application data to reliable memory. Examples of
system level Checkpoint/Restart include BLCR (Berkeley Lab Checkpoint Restart)
by Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the IRIX operating system by SGI,
and Cray’s UNICOS/CLE operating system. Application level checkpoint, on the
other hand, wins in the performance and efficiency aspects. In application level
Checkpoint/Restart, the application calls utility functions to save its own state to
reliable memory. It is the programmer’s responsibility to decide when and what to
save to reliable memory. The programmer has intimate knowledge of the application,
so he or she can choose the optimal point in time to write checkpoints to reliable
memory. Optimal time point means that the data saved to reliable memory is as
small as possible – just enguoth data to recover from the fault. Often times, the
optimal time point is the end of the iterative loop in the application. When less data
has to be written to reliable memory, less burden is placed on the I/O stack. This
is particularly important since I/O is the bottleneck of the computer system, and in
particular the bottleneck of the Checkpoint/Restart method. As a result, application
level Checkpoint/Restart is much more efficient than the system level approach. The
difficult part of application level C/R is that it requires a non-trivial amount of
effort on the part of the programmer. The programmer has to write checkpointing
code for each individual application, and the coding effort is not portable across
applications, nor across platforms. Application level Checkpoint/Restart provides
better efficiency than system level Checkpoint/Restart, but it still suffers from the
inherent performance bottleneck of C/R; that is the I/O traffic needed for writing
checkpoints to reliable memory, which is usually hard drives. Even in application
level Checkpoint/Restart, frequent disk access with large amounts of data is costly.
Checkpointing a large scale application could take hours to finish. Research efforts
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have been made to optimize the amount of data needed to save to disk. One notable
trend is multi-level checkpointing. Multi-level checkpointing provides different levels
of reliability by writing checkpoints to different storage at different frequencies. Local
memory such as RAM and local disk has higher bandwidth and small latency, and
checkpoints can be written to this fast storage at higher frequency. Remote storage
and the parallel file systems are expensive to access, but they are more reliable than
faster local storage. Checkpoints can be written to this slow and more reliable storage
at lower frequencies. Multi-level checkpointing can provide better efficiency than
single level checkpointing. Examples of multi-level checkpointing are FTI (Fault
Tolerance Interface) [5] and SCR (Scalable Checkpoint/Restart) )[71].

2.2.5

Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance

ABFT techniques are highly efficient when applied to appropriate numerical algorithms. The basic idea of algorithm-based fault tolerance is to add data redundancy
to the original data in the numerical algorithm. The redundant data is usually in the
form of checksums. Then the programmer needs to study the numerical algorithm
carefully and design methods to update the checksums to make sure they are the
correct checksums for the data in the original algorithm. When applicable, algorithm
based fault tolerance techniques provide resilience with very low overheads. The
very first work to employ the algorithm based approach in numerical algorithms
was by Huang and Abraham [54] on matrix-matrix multiply and addition, scalar
product, and LU factorization matrix transposition. Their work focuses on dealing
with soft errors in those matrix operations, but the method can be extended to
provide fault tolerance to many numerical algorithms whose core operations are
basic matrix operations. In addition to protection against soft errors, the algorithm
based fault tolerance approach can be used to provide provide protection against
hard errors. The original work deals with algorithms running on systolic arrays,
which are similar to today’s single node machines in that the address space is shared
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by the processing elements in the systolic arrays. Researchers have also designed
algorithm based fault tolerant algorithms on distributed memory machines. The
ABFT techniques that work on distributed memory machines focus on one-sided dense
matrix factorizations [36, 26, 28, 95]. Algorithm based fault tolerance algorithms for
two-sided dense matrix factorizations are rarely studied. The only literature we have
found relating to algorithm based fault tolerance for two-sided matrix factorizations is
by Chen and Abraham [25]. Their work explored algorithm based methods to detect
soft errors in the Hessenberg reduction, the QR algorithm, and the singular value
problem.
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Chapter 3
Parallel Reduction to Hessenberg
Form with Algorithm-Based Fault
Tolerance
This chapter studies the resilience of a two-sided factorization and presents a generic
algorithm-based approach capable of making two-sided factorizations resilient. We
establish the theoretical proof of the correctness and the numerical stability of the
approach in the context of a Hessenberg Reduction (HR) and present the scalability
and performance results of a practical implementation. Our method is a hybrid
algorithm combining an Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) technique with
diskless checkpointing to fully protect the data. We protect the trailing and the
initial part of the matrix with checksums, and protect finished panels in the panel
scope with diskless checkpoints. Compared with the original HR (the ScaLAPACK
PDGEHRD routine) our fault-tolerant algorithm introduces very little overhead,
and maintains the same level of scalability. We prove that the overhead shows a
decreasing trend as the size of the matrix or the size of the process grid increases.
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3.1

Introduction

Mainstream supercomputers are well into the peta-scale era, with the number of
components on a sharp increase over the years. Only one year ago, Jaguar, hosted at
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, included 224,162 cores. During its 537 days of
operation, an average of 2.33 failures per day [68] occured, or on average less than 10
continuous hours of operation. Already today, the new configuration of Jaguar, called
Titan, has a remarkable 299,008 Opteron cores, over 18,688 compute nodes, without
taking into account the number of computing units on the accelerators, which would
put the count in millions. This sharp increase in the number of components is likely
to continue [31], in which case even the most optimistic predictions about the failure
rate of a particular component, in terms of tens of years, depict a gloomy future. A
future where the Mean Time To Interrupt (MTTI) of the entire machine falls under
a few hours, drastically affecting individual applications running on the system [80],
with a lasting impact, not only on the scientific throughput, but directly on the cost
of the scientific simulations.
Numerical libraries are an important category of large scale applications which can
easily utilize hundreds of thousands of cores and run for a prolonged period of time
as building blocks of even longer running applications. Any node failure will render
the time already spent running the application useless. Existing numerical libraries
for high performance computers were designed and implemented when the size of
the systems were modest and component failures were not yet a concern. Altering
these numerical libraries and algorithms by adding reliability capabilities is critical
to enabling them to become suitable for the future architectures with million-way
parallelism. This process will directly benefit all applications built on top of these
basic building blocks.
Libraries with eigenvalue solvers are the method of choice for spectral clustering
of graphs [91] and eigenvector centrality and its widely known form: the PageRank [6,
17, 19, 62]. Hessenberg form is a common intermediate representation for eigenvalue
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calculations.
The Hessenberg reduction [85] is an important step in calculating the eigenvalues
and/or eigenvectors of a dense non-symmetric matrix or for solving the regular
generalized eigenvalue problem. The orthogonal transformations are commonly used
for this reduction for their guaranteed stability even though their accumulated cost
becomes high in terms of both: computation and communication. One of the most
common algorithms that stably computes eigenvalues of a dense matrix is the QR
algorithm [85, 47]. There are two steps in the QR algorithm. In the first step, the
matrix A is reduced to Hessenberg form H by a sequence of similarity transformations:
A = QHQ> . A Hessenberg form, H, is a square matrix in which all the entries
below the first subdiagonal are 0. The second step further reduces H to an upper
triangular form T . The elements on the diagonal of T are the eigenvalues of matrix
A. A Hessenberg matrix is also required for obtaining Hessenberg triangular form
of the matrix pair (A, B) of the regular generalized eigenvalue problem of the form
(A − λB)x = 0 when using the QZ algorithm that originated from the implicitly
shifted QR algorithm [45, 46]. More recent work involves efficient implementations
of various QR iteration methods on modern multicore and distributed memory
systems [58, 16, 49, 59, 50].
The Hessenberg reduction routine is provided in virtually all major numerical
libraries, both for shared and distributed memory architectures.

LAPACK [1]

contains the routine DGEHRD for Hessenberg reduction. ScaLAPACK [8] is the
open source linear algebra library providing LAPACK equivalent functionalities for
distributed memory machines, its Hessenberg reduction routine is PDGEHRD.
Commercial numerical libraries often provide optimized implementations of LAPACK
and ScaLAPACK for specific architectures (such as LibSci for Cray XT architectures).
The high arithmetic complexity overall and low arithmetic intensity of its building
blocks make the Hessenberg reduction a rather costly operation. In spite its high
computational complexity of O( 10
n3 ), the Hessenberg reduction only achieves a
3
fraction of the theoretical machine peak performance (unlike one-sided factorizations
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such as LU and QR). While its long running time makes the Hessenberg reduction
routine more exposed to fail-stop failures, with few exceptions, no algorithmic
solutions to tolerate fail-stop failures have been proposed. Common fault tolerant
techniques such as checkpointing and algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT)
have limitations when applied to the Hessenberg reduction. Checkpointing stores
application data to stable memory at certain time intervals. In Hessenberg reduction,
the whole trailing matrix, which accounts for a significant portion of application data,
is modified very frequently, annihilating even the potential benefits of incremental
checkpointing. Moreover, the checkpointing technique introduces too much overhead
due to frequent write-to-memory accesses (either hard disk or remote main memory).
Similarly, the usual ABFT techniques cannot provide protection for the lower left
part of the matrix during the reduction.
The focus of this chapter is to investigate the possibility and effectiveness of ABFT
techniques in the context of the Hessenberg reduction, to make the algorithm resilient
to process failures. The fault tolerant algorithm we propose is a hybrid approach.
We add row checksums to the right hand side of the matrix, and column checksums
at the bottom of the matrix, which is similar to classic ABFT. We prove that the
checksum relationship between the row checksums on the right hand side and the data
matrix is invariant thus it provides protection to the trailing matrix during the whole
factorization process. Any process failure and data loss in the trailing matrix can
be recovered using the row checksums. The finished part of the matrix is protected
with another group of row checksums. This group of checksums is computed only
once for a group of column blocks upon their completion, thus the cost is very low.
The group of panels currently being factorized are protected with a checkpoint. Due
to the data dependencies of the Hessenberg reduction algorithm, this checkpointing
procedure cannot be avoided. However, there is only one block column that needs
to be checkpointed at any given time, and the overhead caused by this checkpoint
is modest still. Our algorithm can tolerant more than one process failures at a time
assuming that there is at most one failure in one processor row.
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents previous
research work in fault tolerance for matrix computations. Section 3.3 introduces the
Hessenberg reduction algorithm and its implementation, and highlights the challenges
in applying ABFT to the Hessenberg reduction. Sections 3.4 and 3.5, describe the
encoding used to provide the redundancy on the input matrix and the algorithm
to maintain it through the computation. Section 3.6 provides a formal analysis of
the overhead and costs, while Section 3.7 experimentally validates them. Section 3.8
summarizes the results of this chapter and presents future work.

3.2

Related Work

Diverse techniques to recover from a process failure exist, encompassing completely
automatic solutions such as Checkpoint/Restart (C/R) and algorithm-level techniques such as Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT). All these methods are
applicable to linear algebra computations and each has its advantages and drawbacks.
The major advantage of the C/R approach is the generality: it can be applied to
a wide range of applications not only linear algebra software. In the C/R technique,
consistent snapshots of program data in main memory are saved to stable storage
(usually a disk drive) at certain time intervals. Once a failure happens, the entire
application rolls back to the latest snapshot and computation resumes from that point
on (we ignore the complexity related to the consistent view of the entire application
in terms of message or file accesses). In a distributed environment the major cost of
this method comes from obtaining the consistent snapshots and disk access to write
the snapshots, which highlights the major drawback of such approaches, the relatively
high overhead. Langou and Dongarra [61] investigated several checkpoint/recovery
techniques and a checkpoint-free lossy fault tolerant technique for parallel iterative
methods. Robert and Vivien [13, 15] presented a unified model for several common
checkpoint/restart protocols, extended in [21] to cover process replication. Diskless
checkpointing [75, 48, 63] stores checkpoints in main memory to avoid disk accesses.
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The advantage of the ABFT techniques is the potential lower overheads, in
exchange for algorithmic alterations. The algorithm based approach considers the
mathematical operations carried out in the algorithm, and it takes advantage of
the mathematical relationship between different parts of the data to recover from
erroneous data. Algorithm-based techniques do not require disk accesses. The extra
cost entailed is a requirement of a small amount of local memory storage and some
floating point operations. Since CPU speed is orders of magnitude faster than disk
accesses on modern computers, an algorithm based approach has a much smaller
overhead compared against the C/R approach.
Huang and Abraham [54] proposed a system-level method to tolerate errors in
matrix computations in the context of systolic arrays. The matrix is encoded and
operations are carried out on the encoded data. A single failure can be corrected
during the computation. This technique has been successfully applied to matrix
addition and multiplication, scalar product and the LU decomposition. Later, Luk
and Park [64] extended Huang’s method to make it more efficient to correct transient
errors in Gaussian elimination and QR decomposition on systolic arrays.

They

proposed methods to compute checksums of the original matrix. Their method does
not need a rollback in order to correct the error. Kim and Plank [60] presented a
technique based on checksum and reverse computation to tolerate process failures in
matrix operations. Chen and Dongarra [26] designed and implemented an algorithm
based fault tolerance algorithm to tolerate process failures in the ScaLAPACK
PDGEMM routine. Bosilca and Langou [14] also designed and implemented an
algorithm based fault tolerance algorithm for the ScaLAPACK PDGEMM routine
and developed performance models to predict its overhead. Hakkarinen and Chen [51]
implemented an algorithm based fault tolerance algorithm for Cholesky factorization,
an algorithm tolerating a single process failure at a time. Du and Dongarra et al. [36]
designed algorithm based fault tolerance algorithms for LU and QR factorizations
and implemented them in the ScaLAPACK framework. Their methods have a low
overhead and scale well with the increase of matrix size and process grid size. Davies
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et al. [28] also applied the ABFT technique to HPL [74, 32] which is a highly optimized
right-looking LU factorization. Yao and Wang [95] proposed a non-stop algorithm
based fault tolerant scheme to recover the solution vector from fail-stop process
failures in HPL 2.0. Bland et al. [10, 9] proposed a checkpoint-on-Failure protocol for
fault recovery in dense linear algebra.

3.3

ScaLAPACK Hessenberg Reduction

ScaLAPACK uses a 2D block cyclic data distribution to achieve good load balancing.
The Hessenberg reduction routine PDGEHRD in ScaLAPACK also distributes data
in this way. The ScaLAPACK implementation of the Hessenberg reduction is a
blocked algorithm. It first reduces a panel of columns using Householder reflections
and accumulates the Householder reflectors along the way. Later it applies the group
of reflectors all at once to the trailing matrix.

3.3.1

2D Block Cyclic Data Distribution

There are several possible ways to distribute a matrix across distributed memory
machines. Among them, the 2D block cyclic distribution was chosen for ScaLAPACK
based on its good scalability properties and the ability to use Level 3 BLAS routines.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the 2D block cyclic data distribution with an example. A matrix
is partitioned into small nb ×nb square blocks. nb is called the blocking factor. These
blocks are mapped to a 2 × 3 process grid. If a data block is mapped to a process it
means the data block is physically stored in the local memory associated with that
process. All the data blocks assigned to the same process are stored contiguously.
Figure 3.1(a) shows the global matrix from a logical point of view. Each of the six
colors represents a process. Data blocks are assigned to the processes in a round-robin
fashion in both horizontal and vertical directions. Figure 3.1(b) is the processes’ view
of the distribution. Same as in Figure 3.1(a), each color represents a process. Each
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(a) Matrix View

(b) Process View

Figure 3.1: A matrix mapped to a 2 × 3 process grid.
process’s own part of the matrix is stored contiguously in its local memory in column
major. Each process is assigned roughly the same amount of data, which means they
are responsible for roughly the same amount of total floating point operations. Block
algorithms in ScaLAPACK proceed from left to right. As the algorithm continues,
each process has roughly the same amount of work load left. This avoids prolonged
idle time and keeps all the processes busy most of the time.
In this 2D block cyclic distribution, each process’s data correspond to blocks
scattered across the entire global matrix. When a process fails during the Hessenberg
reduction, we get corrupted data blocks in every part of the global matrix.

3.3.2

Failure Model Under 2D Block Cyclic Data Distribution

In this work, we consider process failures. When a process fails in the process grid
the data resident on that process will be all gone. Figure 3.2 shows the status of
the matrix when a process failure happens. The colored squares are the data blocks
owned by the live processes. The blank squares with question marks are the data
blocks owned by the failed process. After we have recovered the process grid, the
replacement process contains invalid data. These invalid data blocks need to be
recovered to their state before the failure happened. If we continue the Hessenberg
reduction without recovering the lost data the final result will be completely wrong.
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Figure 3.2: Global view of the matrix when a process fails.

3.3.3

Non-blocked Hessenberg Reduction

The Hessenberg reduction takes a general nonsymmetric square matrix A ∈ Rn×n and
decomposes it: A = U HU > . U is an orthogonal matrix, H is a Hessenberg matrix.
The non-blocked Hessenberg reduction is an iterative process, n − 1 Householder
transformations are applied to the matrix A from left and right
>
>
= H.
Hn−1
Hn−1 Hn−2 . . . H2 H1 AH1> H2> . . . Hn−2

U = H1 H2 . . . Hn−2 Hn−1 .

The orthogonal matrix U is

A Householder transformation Hi can be generated

efficiently [85, page 83]. The non-blocked version uses Level 2 BLAS operations which
have a low flop/transfer ratio and are slow. ScaLAPACK uses a blocked Hessenberg
reduction algorithm which has a larger number of efficient Level 3 BLAS operations.

3.3.4

Blocked Hessenberg Reduction

In the blocked Hessenberg reduction [35] nb (the blocking factor in the 2D block
cyclic distribution) Householder reflectors are accumulated and applied to the trailing
matrix together using Level 3 BLAS. Using the WY representation [7, 79] the
reduction can be written as:
>
· · · H1> AH1 · · · Hnb = A − V W − Y V >
Hnb

(3.1)

where V is the matrix formed by the nb Householder vectors used to reduce the first
nb columns, T is an nb × nb upper triangular matrix, W = T > V > A, Y = AV >
Algorithm 1 is the pseudo code for PDGEHRD. The function call PDLAHRD
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Algorithm 1 PDGEHRD
1: for every panel do
2:
PDLAHRD on the panel, return V, T, Y
3:
PDGEMM: trail(A) = trail(A) − Y V >
4:
PDLARFB: trail(A) = trail(A) − V T > V > · trail(A)
5: end for
reduces a panel with a sequence of Householder transformations. It takes the trailing
submatrix, reduces the first panel of nb columns, and overwrites the bottom part of
the panel with the Householder reflectors. Although this panel factorization routine
only modifies the panel, it has a data dependency on the trailing matrix. In other
words, once the trailing matrix is modified and we lose data inside the panel, the
panel factorization cannot be repeated. This poses a challenge for our fault tolerant
algorithm design as explained in later sections.
Figure 3.3 illustrates one iteration of the ScaLAPACK Hessenberg reduction
algorithm. In Figure 3.3(a) the yellow part is part of the final result of the Hessenberg
matrix. This part will not be touched once they have been computed. Columns in
the green part are the Householder reflectors used to transform the matrix. The
red part is the trailing matrix which will be reduced in future iterations. As other
factorizations in ScaLAPACK, PDGEHRD is an iterative algorithm.

In each

iteration, PDLAHRD reduces the first block column which is called the panel. This
call produces the final result of the desired Hessenberg matrix (the yellow upper
trapezoid in Figure 3.3(b)) and nb Householder reflectors (the green lower trapezoid
in Figure 3.3(b)). This call also generates intermediate matrices V and Y which are
used by the PDGEMM and PDLARFB immediately following the panel reduction
to update the trailing submatrix. When this iteration finishes, we get a smaller trailing
submatrix: the red part on the right in Figure 3.3(e). In the next iteration, the same
process is repeated on the shrunk trailing submatrix which further reduces it to a
smaller size. This algorithm is a right-looking algorithm, in that, the updates only
access data to the right of the current panel. Matrix entries to the left of the current
panel are never touched again after the panel computation proceeded to the right.
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PDLAHRD

PDLAHRD

PDLAHRD

PDGEMM

PDLARFB

(a) Beginning of iter- (b) Factorize
ation
panel

the

(c) Right update

(d) Left update

(e) End of iteration

Figure 3.3: One iteration of PDGEHRD

3.4

Encoding The Input Matrix

The essential part of ABFT technique is to expand the original matrix data with
redundant data and maintain the relationship between the original matrix and the
redundant data through computation. In our fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction
algorithm, we chose to append the matrix with row checksums to the right of the
original matrix. We show the checksum scheme with an example in Figure 3.4. A
matrix of N ×N blocks is mapped to a P ×Q process grid in the 2D block cyclic fashion
(here N = 8, P = 2, Q = 3). Each process will be assigned at most dN/P e × dN/Qe
data blocks. We add dN/Qe × 2 block columns to the right as checksum blocks. Data
blocks in the same position of different processes of the same process row are added
together element-wise to form a checksum block. This checksum block is duplicated
and stored next to itself. The details are shown in Figure 3.4(a).
We also expand the original matrix with checksum blocks at the bottom. Only the
storage is allocated, the actual checksums are not actually calculated in the beginning.
The extra storage at the bottom will be used for pseudo checksums of the V matrix
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sum

copy

sum

copy
(a) Matrix View

(b) Process View

Figure 3.4: An encoded matrix mapped to a 2 × 3 process grid.
which contains the block Householder reflectors. The number of pseudo checksum
block rows at the bottom is the same as the number of checksum block columns to
the right of the matrix. And each pseudo checksum block is calculated in this way:
pretend the matrix is distributed over a Q × Q process grid (despite that it is actually
distributed over a P × Q grid), then we sum corresponding data blocks in different
processes in the same process column element-wise and obtain a pseudo checksum
block. The summing relationship is also shown in Figure 3.4(a). In this figure, the
pseudo checksum block is the sum of the first three blocks, because had we distributed
the matrix over a 3 × 3 process grid, the first three data blocks would be the first
blocks in the three processes in the their respective local matrices.
These checksum blocks are treated as normal matrix data and distributed across
the process grid. Figure 3.4(b) shows each process’s local matrix containing the
checksum blocks. Each black box represents a process. The white blocks are the
checksum blocks. Note that the example in Figure 3.4 uses a small process grid, the
checksum data are relatively large compared to the original input matrix. But in
practice the process grid is rarely this small. The checksum data only accounts for a
small portion of the input matrix when the size of the process grid increases.

27

3.5

The Algorithm

Algorithm 2 ABFT Hessenberg Reduction (non-delayed)
1: Compute the row checksum of matrix A, get Ae
2: for each i in Ne iterations do
3:
if i ≡ 0 mod Q then
4:
Take a snapshot of the panel scope.
5:
end if
6:
PDLAHRD on the panel, return V, T, Y
7:
Calculate column pseudo checksum of V , get Ve
8:
Send V to the next process column.
9:
The process column owning the ith panel make a copy of its Y and T , send
Y, T to the next process column.
10:
PDGEMM: trail(Ae ) = trail(Ae ) − Y (Ve )>
11:
PDLARFB:
trail(Ae ) = trail(Ae ) − V T > V > · trail(Ae )
12:
Recover from failure if there is any.
13: end for

3.5.1

Maintaining Data Redundancy in the Factorization

Two versions of ABFT Hessenberg reduction algorithms are shown in Algorithm 2
and Algorithm 3. These two versions are mathematically equivalent, but their actual
implementations have different performance characteristics due to the behavior of
PBLAS routines. We use Algorithm 2 to explain how the method works. In iteration
i, we refer to the Q block columns starting from bi/Qc to di/Qe (inclusive) as the
panel scope. N is the dimension of the original matrix, nb is the blocking factor.
Algorithm 2 first calculates row checksums for each block row in line 1. This
is achieved with a reduction operation on each block row. Calculating this global
checksum for the entire matrix requires many reduction operations and large
communication volume. But this checksum is computed only once at the beginning
of the algorithm. The cost is not high compared to the time cost of the actual
Hessenberg reduction.
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In line 4, the algorithm takes a snapshot of the panel scope before starting the
factorization of the block columns in the panel scope. The final Hessenberg matrix
contains zeros in its lower part, below the first subdiagonal. In order to save storage,
the ScaLAPACK Hessenberg reduction algorithm stores the Householder reflectors
in the lower part of the matrix. Because the zero entries are overwritten with the
Householder reflectors, the row checksum relationship between the current panel scope
and its checksum no longer holds. Once a process failure causes data loss in the
trailing matrix part of the current panel, we can retrieve the pre-update data from
the snapshot and reapply all updates from the beginning of the current panel scope.
By so doing, we can restore the lost data to their state right before the failure.
Lines 8 and 9 record the state of the panel scope after each panel factorization.
These two lines also record the state of Y and T which are the results of panel
factorization. Y and T are stored in a separate workspace apart from A. The newly
calculated Householder reflectors are stored in-place in the lower portion of A. These
reflectors do not have any protection mechanism. Unlike a recent implementation
of QR factorization [36], the panel factorization in the Hessenberg reduction has a
data dependence on the trailing submatrix. The PDLAHRD routine needs the
unmodified trailing submatrix to factorize the panel. This means that the panel
factorization result has to be protected right away after it is obtained. We do not
delay the recording of the state of the panel result (V , Y and T ) till either the
PDGEMM call or the PDLARFB call. This is because in the case of a process
failure, data loss would occur in the panel result. This is possible for a failure that
happens after the panel factorization and after the start of the trailing matrix update.
The panel result cannot be recovered in that case by a rollback of the panel and refactorizing it despite the fact that we can manage to recover the panel data right
before its factorization. It is possible to reverse the effect of the trailing matrix
update if we store the V , Y and T matrices which were used to update the trailing
matrix. But they are not available since these three matrices are exactly what are
supposed to be recovered.
29

Line 12 recovers data that were lost due to a process failure. The details of the
recovery procedure are explained in section 3.5.3.
The following theorem shows how the correctness of the checksum is maintained
throughout the algorithm.
Theorem 1. The row checksums for block columns after the current panel scope are
valid at the end of each iteration.
Proof. We proceed by showing that the checksum remains correct after each step.
Suppose A is of size m × n, e is a column vector of 1’s of length n. For simplicity, in
the following proof we assume the block size nb is 1, and the process grid is m × n, so
each process takes one entry of the matrix but the proof holds true for any nb value
and process grid size.
1. Before the for loop all the row checksums are just calculated, no data has been
modified. Thus the checksums are valid.
2. In the first iteration, after the PDLAHRD, the checksum for the first panel
scope is destroyed. But the checksums for the block columns after the first panel
scope are still valid, because both the original matrix data and the checksums
haven’t been modified.
3. In the first iteration, after the PDGEMM, the checksums for the block columns
after the first panel scope are still valid.

Ae − Y (Ve )>


>
h
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= A Ae − Y 
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4. In the first iteration, after the PDLARFB, the checksums for the block
columns after the first panel scope are still valid.
Ae − V T > V > Ae
= (I − V T > V > )Ae
h
i
= (I − V T > V > ) A Ae
h
i
= (I − V T > V > )A (I − V T > V > )Ae
h
i
= (A − V T > V > A) (A − V T > V > A)e

By mathematical induction, the row checksums for block columns after the current
panel scope are valid at the end of each iteration.

3.5.2

Checksum Duplication

We protect the row checksums appended to the right of the matrix by maintaining
two copies of exactly the same checksums. Because the checksums are distributed
as normal matrix data over the process grid, any process failure will also cause loss
of the checksums resident on the failed process. To solve this problem we maintain
two copies of the checksums as in [36]. Both are kept valid through updating them
independently. These two copies are stored next to each other so they are distributed
to different process columns. Since only one process could fail, we always have one
valid copy and can use this copy to recover the other copy. This approach does not
need dedicated checksum processes, and does not have to assume that the checksum
processes never fail. This approach also has good load balancing property. These
traits are preferable because it does not require users of the ScaLAPACK library to
change their application or the way they run their application. It is also easier to
implement since the code has clear logic. The update of the checksum data does
not need special treatment, the only thing needed is to change the dimensions of the
trailing matrix during the update step of the original ScaLAPACK code.
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Algorithm 3 ABFT Hessenberg Reduction (delayed)
1: Compute the row checksum of matrix A, get Ae
2: for each i in 1 to dN/nbe iterations do
3:
if i ≡ 0 mod Q then
4:
Take a snapshot of the panel scope.
5:
end if
6:
PDLAHRD on the panel, return V, T, Y
7:
if a process owns parts of V, T, Y then
8:
Store V, T, Y in its neighbor in the next process column.
9:
end if
10:
if i ≡ 0 mod Q then
11:
Calculate column checksums of V from the last Q block columns, get Ve
12:
end if
13:
PDGEMM: trail(Ae ) = trail(Ae ) − Y (Ve )>
14:
PDLARFB:
trail(Ae ) = trail(Ae ) − V T > V > · trail(Ae )
15:
if i ≡ 0 mod Q then
16:
Update the row checksums at the right side of the original matrix using the
V, Y, T matrices from the last Q panel factorizations.
17:
end if
18:
if a failure happens then
19:
Compute column checksums of V from the already factorized panels in the
current panel scope, get Ve .
20:
Update the row checksums at the right side of the original matrix.
21:
Recover from failure.
22:
end if
23: end for
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Area 2

Area 3

Area 4

Area 1

Figure 3.5: Partitions of the matrix. The dotted block column in area 3 has just been
factorized. Area 1 (red) is the trailing matrix after the current panel scope. Area 2
(blue) is the finished part of the matrix. Area 3 (yellow) is the block columns in the
current panel scope that have been factorized. Area 4 (green) is part of the current
panel scope which belongs to the trailing matrix.

3.5.3

Recovery

When the Hessenberg factorization is in progress, the matrix can be divided into
different areas based on the status of the data as shown in Figure 3.5. Different areas
of the matrix data need different methods to recover.
The recovery process:
1. Recover the runtime system. Replace the lost process and restore the process
grid.
2. Recover lost checksums using the duplication.
3. Recover lost data in area 1 and 2 using the row checksum on the right and the
data on the live processes. First calculate the sum of data blocks on different
processes in the same process row, then subtract this partial sum from the
checksum to get the lost data blocks. Send the recovered data blocks to the
replacement process.
4. Recover the lost data in area 3 using the checkpoint.
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5. Recover the lost data in area 4.

First retrieve the backup data from the

snapshot, then apply all the left updates and right updates since the last
snapshot.
6. Resume computation as usual. Ready to recover from the next failure.

3.6

Performance Analysis

In this section we use N to refer to the dimension of the global matrix.
There are several sources where the overhead of the fault tolerant Hessenberg
reduction comes from. Firstly, it carries out more floating point operations than
the ScaLAPACK version. Secondly, we need to perform bookkeeping for the panel
results. Thirdly, we need to generate vertical pseudo checksums for V after the panels
are factorized.
Global row checksums have to be calculated at the beginning of the factorization.
On a P × Q process grid, every process row calculates the checksums inside the
process row using reduction operations. Every process row performs the reductions
in parallel with other process rows. Hence the total time cost is the same as the time
cost in any one process row. There are N/ (nb · Q) block columns in one process, for
every one block column there is one reduction operation. Let TQ be the time cost
of one reduction operation among Q processes, the overhead incurred by the global
checksum calculation at the beginning of the fault tolerance Hessenberg reduction
algorithm is:
TQ

N
nb · Q

This part of the overhead is a one time cost. The Hessenberg reduction is computation
intensive, and the total floating point operation count is O( 10
N 3 ). As the size of
3
the matrix N increases, the operation count increases quickly, this initial one-time
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checksum cost becomes insignificantly small very quickly compared to the total cost
of the original ScaLAPACK Hessenberg reduction routine.
Extra floating point operations are needed to maintain the correct global checksum
on the right side of the matrix. The panel factorization will stop at the end of the
original matrix, so no panel factorization has to be done on the checksum block
columns. The trailing matrix updates have to be performed on the checksums.
In every iteration there is a right update which is a PDGEMM, and there is
a left update which is a PDLARFB. The PDLARFB contains three steps: a
PDGEMM, a PDTRMM and another PDGEMM. For the right updates, the
number of checksum block columns decreases as the factorization proceeds. The
reason is that the block columns to the left of the current panel and in the current
panel scope are not protected by the right side checksum, and we do not need to
update these not used checksums anymore. For the left updates on the checksums,
not only does the number of columns of the checksums decrease, but also the number
of rows decreases.
The amount of extra floating point operations caused by the right update
(PDGEMM) is:

FLOPpdgemm =

N/nb−1
P

2N (2nb) nb · Q

i=1

=

3

2 NQ − 2N 2 nb

The amount of floating point operations introduced by the left update (PDLARFB)
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is:
FLOPpdlarfb
N
−1
nb

=

X

2nbQ (2nb · I) (2nb · I + 2) + (2nb · I) nb 2 Q
I=1

=

N 2 nb 4
8 N3
− 4N 2 nb + 4N 2 +
+ N Qnb 2
3 Q
Q
3
2
− 4N Q · nb − N nb

The total amount of extra floating point operations by maintaining the checksum is
N/nb−1

FLOPExtra =

X

[FLOPpdgemm + FLOPpdlarfb ]

i=1

The total count of floating point operations of the original ScaLAPACK Hessenberg reduction routine is:
FLOPOrig ≈

10 3
N
3

So the overhead introduced by maintaining the checksums is given by:
FLOPExtra
FLOPOrig
FLOPpdgemm + FLOPpdlarfb
=
FLOPOrig

3 21
6nb
4
nb
4 Qnb 2
=
−
+
+
+
10 3 Q
N
N
NQ 3 N2

4Qnb nb 2
−
− 2
N2
N

Overhead =

These extra floating point operations are all in matrix matrix multiplies which are
efficiently implemented, so the overhead in terms of floating point operation count can
also be interpreted as overhead in terms of running time. From the formula above,
we observe that as the size of the matrix is big enough, N tends to infinity, and the
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terms containing N in the denominator tend to 0:
lim Overhead =

N →∞

1
5Q

(3.2)

which means that the theoretical lower bound of the overhead introduced by
maintaining the checksums is 1/(5Q). By “theoretical” we mean the ideal case where
there is no time cost for memory accesses, and no time cost for communications
between processes.

When we keep the blocking factor nb unchanged and keep

increasing the matrix size N , the least amount of overhead we have to pay is 1/(5Q) of
the ScaLAPACK Hessenberg reduction routine. In practice it is not possible to access
memory and transfer data between processes without time costs. The actual observed
overhead introduced by these extra floating point operations should be higher than
the above theoretical lower bound.
The second part of the overhead comes from bookkeeping the panel factorization
results after panels are factorized. The bookkeeping is done by sending the matrices
to the neighboring process in the next process column and storing them there. There
are three matrices which have to be saved: the panel itself, Y and T . Let Tsr be
the time cost to perform a Send-Receive operation between two processes, the total
overhead incurred by bookkeeping the panel factorization results is:
Tsr

N
nb

The value of Tsr varies depending on the MPI implementation and the network
between processes.
Also there is the overhead of computing the vertical pseudo checksum of V . Every
pseudo checksum block calculation involves a reduction operation, and this pseudo
checksum has to be calculated in every iteration. Let TP denote the time cost
to perform a reduction among P processes, the total time cost of calculating this
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checksum is given by:
TP
Storage overhead.

N
nb · Q

Extra storage is necessary for the checksums and for

bookkeeping the panel factorization results. We keep two copies of the row checksums
on the right of the original matrix. The amount of memory needed for this is:
2N

N
Q

We also need the same amount of storage for the pseudo checksum of V . This
makes the total amount of checksum memory:
4N

N
Q

The amount of memory needed to store the snapshot of the panel scope is
N (N/Q + 2nb), the amount of memory needed by checkpointing Y and T is:
N (N/Q) + nb (N/Q)
Adding them all together, the total amount of storage overhead is:
4

3.7

N2
+ (N + nb) (N/Q)
Q

Experiments

In this section we evaluate the performance of our fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction
algorithm through experiments. We used DOE’s Titan as our test platform.
Titan is a hybrid supercomputing system located at Oak Ridge National
Laboratory. It is the fastest parallel computer on the current TOP500 list (Nov.,
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2012).

Since we are only using the traditional CPU section of the machine,

information about NVIDIA GPUs on Titan is not reported. Titan is composed of
18,688 nodes with 299,008 cores, for a CPU peak performance in double precision of
2.63 PFlop/s.

3.7.1

Overhead Without Failure

Figure 3.6(a) and Figure 3.6(b) shows the overhead of our fault tolerant Hessenberg
reduction on Titan when no failure happens in the factorization. The overhead
measured in the percentage of performance penalty drops as the problem size
increases. The performance of Hessenberg reduction is not as high as the one-sided
factorizations (LU, QR and Cholesky) on both distributed memory machines and
shared memory machines. The reason is that Hessenberg reduction is rich in Level
2 BLAS (GEMV). Level 2 BLAS routines have a 1-to-1 flop to word ratio. These
routines are memory bound and hence their performance is limited by the bandwidth
of the memory. In terms of performance, our fault tolerant algorithm has a small
overhead. The overhead with a matrix of size 6000 on a 6×6 process grid is 7.6%. The
overhead keeps decreasing as the matrix size increases and the process grid increases.
The overhead drops to 1.8% for a matrix of size 96000 (process grid 96 × 96). This
overhead includes the overhead of calculating the initial checksum, the computation
overhead incurred by updating the checksum, the overhead of calculating the vertical
pseudo checksum of V after each panel factorization, and the overhead of the recovery
process. Equation 3.2 states that the overhead caused by extra computation on the
checksums asymptotically decreases to 1/(5Q). It accounts for a decreasing portion of
the total overhead as the problem size and process grid become large. The overhead
caused by saving the results of the panel factorization (PDLAHRD) becomes the
major contributor of the total overhead. Over the course of the factorization, the
total communication volume of this saving process is roughly two times the global
matrix data volume. Depending on the network bandwidth between the processes,
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this part of the overhead can account for different percentages of the total overhead.
Generally, this part of the overhead tends to a small constant percentage when the
problem size increases.
Figure 3.7(b) shows the overhead of Algorithm 3 on Titan. We see that the
performance overhead keeps dropping in the beginning, but it starts to go up again
at grid size 96 × 96. There are three main reasons which cause the overhead increase.
Firstly, when we delay the updates of the global checksums at the end of each panel
scope, these updates resulting from each panel factorization are applied sequentially.
When the process grid size increases, the number of panels in the panel scope also
becomes larger. The sequence of updates to the global checksums takes longer to
finish. Secondly, when updating the checksums separately from the trailing matrix,
the updates (PDLARFB and PDGEMM) are applied to a tall and skinny matrix.
These two routines perform best when applied to more rectangular matrices. Also,
splitting the calls to these routines disrupts their internal communication pipeline
that hides latency and creates additional synchronization points upon exit and then
entry into these routines. Thirdly, updating the checksums separately causes extra
communication between processes owning V and processes owning the checksums.
These overheads are critical in the context of an already communication-rich operation
such as the Hessenberg reduction, and they inhibit scalability as the Figure 3.7(b)
indicates.

3.7.2

Overhead With Failure

Figure 3.6(c) and Figure 3.6(d) shows the performance and performance overhead
of our fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm on Titan when one failure
happens in the factorization. Compared with Figure 3.6(a) and Figure 3.6(b)and
the performance overhead shown in the Figure 3.6(c) and Figure 3.6(d) include one
more factor: the recovery overhead. The recovery process involves a global row-wise
reduction operation on the entire global matrix. Before this global reduction the data
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Figure 3.6: Overhead of FT-Hess without failures and with one failure. Platform:
Titan, NB = 80, Algorithm 2
on the replacement process are set to zero. This global reduction operation calculates
a new global checksum. The lost data belonging to Area 1 and Area 2 in Figure 3.5
are recovered using the new checksum and the old checksum that we have been
maintaining along with the factorization. The cost of this global reduction depends
on the bandwidth of the link between the processes. This cost accounts for a small
portion of the total running time of the Hessenberg reduction. Figure 3.6(d) shows
that, even with the recovery cost included, the total overhead of our fault tolerant
Hessenberg reduction algorithm is still very low and it decreases as the problem
increases. It is down to 4.03% for the matrix of size 96000 (process grid dimension:
96 × 96).

41

6000

9

FT-Hess
ScaLapack Hess

Performance Penalty (%)

8

5000
7
Percent (%)

GFLOPS

4000
3000
2000

6
5
4
3
2

1000
1
0
6k (6x6)

12k (12x12) 24k (24x24) 48k (48x48)
Matrix size (Process grid size)

96k (96x96)

0
6k (6x6)

(a) Performance

12k (12x12) 24k (24x24) 48k (48x48)
Matrix size (Process grid size)

96k (96x96)

(b) Penalty in percentage

Figure 3.7: Overhead of FT-Hess without failures. Platform: Titan, NB = 80,
Algorithm 3

3.7.3

Numerical Stability After Recovery From a Failure

In this subsection, we show how our fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm
maintains the same level of numerical stability as the original ScaLAPACK algorithm.
Floating point numbers are represented in IEEE 754 format in modern computers,
floating point operations are not carried out in exact arithmetic. Standard error
analysis for the reduction of a general matrix A to Hessenberg form H by means of
similarity transformations shows the process to be backward stable [92, page 363]. In
particular, the process reduces a nearby problem Â = A + E into Ĥ with a set of
similarity transformations U and at the end we get:
Ĥ = U > ÂU

(3.3)

The bound on the residual error E [92, page 351] is
kEkF /kAkF ≤ φ(N )

(3.4)

where φ is a low degree polynomial [92, page 351, Table 1] and  is the unit roundoff
(machine precision). This is an expected result since the transformation only employs
orthogonal transformations and therefore does not introduce rounding errors larger
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than those already existing in the data. In fact, its backward error analysis has been
used in a scheme that detects soft errors in linear algebra operations at runtime [11].
The ScaLAPACK PDGEHRD routine uses the following factorization residual
to verify the factorization result
r∞ =

kA − U HU > k∞
kAk∞ N 

where r∞ is a slowly growing function of N . For practical purposes r∞ may be checked
against a constant threshold rt . We consider the reduction correct if the residual r∞
is smaller than the threshold rt = 3.
To show backward stability of the recovery process, we use the technique of
projecting the error (resulting from a fault) back into the original matrix A [64]. We
then exploit the fact that the backward error analysis already involves a perturbation
to A and the reduction is shown to provide a solution to a nearby problem Â with a
satisfactory bound on the perturbing error. Then, using a standard dot-product error
analysis [22], we show that the numerical stability is not affected by the recovery from
the fault. The dot-product analysis applies to our checksum procedure with only a
slight modification.
There are three sources of errors in addition to the error existing in the original
algorithm after the recovery:
• from the initial encoding of the input matrix,
• from updating the global checksum,
• from recovering the lost data in the case of a failure.
Errors from encoding the input matrix. The initial checksums are calculated
through a simple summation operation. On a P × Q process grid, each checksum
element involves at most Q − 1 addition operations . The rounding error (denoted by
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E1 ) introduced by encoding the input matrix is bounded by
E1 ≤ (Q − 1) 

(3.5)

This upper bound is reached in the worst case scenario when rounding errors happen
in every element and all have the same sign. In reality, rounding errors do not happen
for every operation and/or do not all have the same sign. A pair of rounding errors
with opposite signs will cancel each other out. The actual error is much smaller
than the upper bound – the suggested approximation is the square root of quantities
dependent on the problem size [93].
Errors from updating the global checksum.

The global checksums on

the right hand side of the input matrix are updated by two routines PDGEMM
and PDLARFB, both of them perform matrix-matrix multiplications. These two
routines are numerically stable which means the rounding error of the input data does
not grow after the calculation.
Errors from recovering the lost data in the case of a failure. During
recovery we calculate a new checksum of the data on the still live processes. In the
worst case scenario the rounding error (denoted by E2 ) could be
E2 ≤ (Q − 1) 

(3.6)

In the worst case, E2 has the opposite sign to E1 , which gives the worst case error in
the recovered data compared against the lost data
E3 = E1 + E2 ≤ 2 (Q − 1) 

(3.7)

If the failure happens in the i-th iteration, denote the accumulated transformations
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so far by U(i) , we have


>

kA − U HU +
r̂∞ =
=

=

>
U(i) E3 U(i)



k∞

kAk∞ N 


>
k A − U(i) E3 U(i)
− U HU > k∞
kAk∞ N 


>
k A − U(i) E3 U(i)
− U HU > k∞

= c×

×

>
kA − U(i) E3 U(i)
k∞

>
k∞ N 
kA − U(i) E3 U(i)


>
k A − U(i) E3 U(i)
− U HU > k∞

kAk∞

>
k∞ N 
kA − U(i) E3 U(i)

where
c =
≤

>
k∞
kA − U(i) E3 U(i)
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>
kAk∞ + kU(i) E3 U(i)
k∞
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kAk∞
>
k∞
kU(i) E3 U(i)

kAk∞
≤ 1 + N/P × 2(Q − 1)
Again, this is the theoretical upper bound assuming the worst possible cases. In
reality rounding errors are mostly likely random, so they will cancel each other out.
The recovery process will not cause observable extra backward errors.
Table 3.1 shows a comparison of the residual r obtained in our fault tolerant
algorithm when a failure happens and the residual obtained in the fault-free
ScaLAPACK routine. We can see that our fault tolerant algorithm computes answers
on the same order of magnitude as the original ScaLAPACK algorithms, with minor
differences due to the randomness of the initial matrix and the lack of bitwise
reproducibility of the algorithm. Overall, our fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction
algorithm is as backward stable as the ScaLAPACK version.
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Table 3.1: Residual Comparison
Grid Size

FT-Hess

6 × 6 5.208026×10−3
12 × 12 3.099298×10−3
24 × 24 2.166615×10−3
48 × 48 1.361631×10−3
96 × 96 1.038104×10−3

3.8

ScaLAPACK Hess
5.014403×10−3
2.348654×10−3
1.174153×10−3
6.350293×10−4
3.379741×10−4

Conclusions and Future Work

This chapter describes a hybrid fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm
combining diskless checkpointing and algorithm based fault tolerance techniques
under the fail/stop failure model, capable to recover from one process failure at
a time. After the successful recovery, the computation is resumed and ready to
progress and to tolerate the next process failure. We use algorithm based fault
tolerance techniques to protect the trailing matrix, and checksums to protect the left
part of the Hessenberg matrix, while the panel scope is protected through diskless
checkpointing. We confirmed the low overhead and good scalability of our approach
both from a theoretical standpoint and through experiments on various scales. The
overhead decreases when the matrix size or the process grid size increases, making
this approach a good candidate for large scale environments. Future work would
include exploring methods to tolerate multiple simultaneous failures and designing
fault tolerant algorithms for other two-sided factorizations in large scale parallel
computing environments.

46

Chapter 4
Parallel Reduction to Tridiagonal
Form with Algorithm-Based Fault
Tolerance
4.1

Introduction

Today’s massively parallel computer systems are more vulnerable to failures than ever
before. Supercomputers in the early days only had a few processors. Over time the
increasing demand for computational power and the development computer hardware
impacted the design of supercomputers, as as result supercomputers containing tens
of thousands of commodity processors become the norm. A large processor count
provides high computational power, meanwhile it also brings lower reliability of the
entire system. A study in 2007 on the failure rates of LANL systems show that the
failure rate reached 1100 failures per year [80]. That is the system can run without
interrupt for 12 hours. The 2011 version of the Oak Ridge National Lab’s ten-year
exascale road map projected that in year 2020, the total core count of the machine
will be on the order of O(billion), and the Mean Time to Interrupt will be 22 120 minutes [43]. When High performance computing enters the exascale era, the
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reliability of high performance computing systems become a practical concern for
large scale, long running applications.
Over the years, many techniques have been proposed to provide resilience for applications/restart. The most successful technique among them is checkpointing/restart.
Checkpointing is a general purpose resilience technique which stores the application
state into reliable storage from time to time. When a failure strikes and some process
loses its data, the application reads the last checkpoint and restarts from that point.
Usually checkpoints are taken periodically. The checkpoint interval is a optimization
parameter. More frequent checkpointing incurs higher bottom line overhead, which
is the overhead no matter failures occurs or not. Checkpointing/restart can be
implemented at the system level or the user level. In system level checkpointing, the
operating system provides the checkpointing functionality, the user is not required to
put any effort to obtain resilience for the application. An example of system level
checkpoint/restart implementation is the Berkeley Lab Checkpoint/Restart (BLCR)
for LINUX [41]. User level checkpointing calls for more user effort. It is the user’s
responsibility to decide when to checkpoint and what content to checkpoint. In order
to do this the user need to understand the code and modify the code to gain fault
tolerance.
The checkpointing technique works well on a broad range of applications, but for
certain class of codes, we can do better using algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT).
Algorithm based fault tolerance was brought forward by Huang and Abraham [55] and
later gained interest from more researchers. Like the checkpoint/restart technique, the
ABFT technique also keeps redundant data for error correction. There are two main
differences between checkpoint/restart and ABFT. Firstly, unlike checkpoint/restart
which stores redundant data (checkpoints) to stable storage (slow), ABFT stores
redundant data in main memory (fast). The average access time of hard drives
is

200 times slower than the average DRAM. Secondly, the redundant data in

ABFT are mathematically computed from the application data, and the mathematical
relationship between the redundant data and the application data is kept an invariant
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through modest computation.

The size of redundant data is small.

Whereas

the redundant data in checkpoint/restart are simply a copy of the application
data. ABFT is naturally suitable for numerical software whose main operations are
mathematical operations.
Matrix factorizations are critical building blocks of many scientific codes. They
often run for a prolonged period of time, hence are easily exposed to interrupts.
Researchers have been trying to incorporate ABFT into parallel matrix factorizations.
ABFT enabled versions of the three most important one-sided matrix factorization
algorithms (LU, QR, Cholesky) have been developed. Compared with one-sided
factorizations, it is harder to protect two-sided factorizations (Hessenberg, tridiagonal,
bidiagonal) with ABFT because two-sided factorization algorithms are more complex
and more effort is needed to capture the algorithm properties in order to use ABFT
to provide resilience for them.
In this chapter we present a fault tolerant parallel tridiagonal reduction algorithm
with ABFT. The tridiagonal reduction of a dense matrix is the first step in solving
the symmetric eigenvalue problem. The eigenvalue problem is encountered very
often in structural mechanics and electrodynamics. The eigenvalues are related to
the resonance frequencies of systems, the eigenvectors are related to the invariant
probability measures of stochastic processes [24, 12].

The tridiagonal reduction

algorithm for real matrices is implemented as DSYTRD in LAPACK [1], as
PDSYTRD in ScaLAPACK [8].

The tridiagonal reduction stage is the most

time consuming step in solving the symmetric eigenvalue problem. Providing fault
tolerance to the tridiagonal reduction stage can greatly improve the chance of
completing the symmetric eigenvalue problem on large scale computers.
The main contribution of this chapter is a ABFT enabled parallel tridiagonal
reduction algorithm as implemented in ScaLAPACK. The tridiagonal reduction
algorithm proceeds in a panel factorization–trailing matrix update loop. We protect
the factorization using checksums. Checksums are appended to the right side of the
original matrix and are updated the same way as the trailing matrix update in the
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non-ABFT tridiagonal reduction algorithm. We prove that the appended checksums
remain valid at the end of each loop iteration. When a process failure strikes, we
subtract matrix elements from the corresponding checksum, this way data on the
failed process are recovered. In ScaLAPACK the upper (or lower, depending on user
preference) is not accessed in order to save computation and data movement, so the
upper (or lower) half of the matrix contains invalid data after the factorization starts.
However, the checksums are valid assuming both the upper and lower triangle of the
matrix contain valid data. Before we recover the lost data, we fill up the necessary
part in the upper triangle using data from the lower triangle. We can do this because
the trailing matrix is always symmetric.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: we give a description of algorithm
based fault tolerance and its integration in linear algebra software in section 4.2.
In Section 4.3 we list our contributions. In Section 4.4 we explain the tridiagonal
reduction algorithm as implemented in ScaLAPACK, the data distribution pattern
in ScaLAPACK and the type of failure our fault tolerant algorithm is meant to
deal with. Section 4.5 is devoted to the ABFT enabled fault tolerant tridiagonal
reduction algorithm. In Section 4.6 we analyze the asymptotic computation overhead
and storage overhead of the fault tolerant algorithm.

4.2

Related Work

ScaLAPACK [8] is a widely used software package which contains distributed dense
linear algebra routines. ScaLAPACK is available on virtually all distributed memory
high performance computers.

The reference implementation of ScaLAPACK is

available on netlib. Major computer vendors usually offer optimized versions of
ScaLAPACK for their own machines.

For example, Cray’s scientific computing

package libsci contains a version of ScaLAPACK optimized for Cray machines.
There has been very few work to protect the tridiagonal reduction algorithm.
Early work on the fault tolerant symmetric eigenvalue problem focused on systolic
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arrays [25]. A systolic array is a group of data processing units connected together
through a mesh network. Each data processing unit performs some operation on one
data element at a time. Data flow through the network of processing units much
like the pulsing blood flow in the human body driven by the heart, hence the name
systolic array. Systolic array is an interesting architecture, but it is not commonly
seen nowadays.
Later, in the 1990s, Kim et. al. [60] designed a fault tolerant scheme for the
Hessenberg reduction which is the first step of solving the nonsymmetric eigenvalue
problem. Their scheme works in a distributed memory environment. The algorithm
takes a checkpoint of the matrix at the end of each iteration. The checkpoint is in
the form of the sum of data blocks on different nodes, this sum is called a checksum.
Upon a failure, the algorithm rolls back to the end of the previous iteration using
reverse computation, then uses the checksum to recover the failure. The advantage
of their method is that they uses checksums as a in-memory checkpoint which not
only reduces the size of the data to bookkeep but also saves frequent disk accesses.
The drawback is that in their method the checksums need to be recalculated in every
iteration. This brings extra synchronization cost and data transfer cost.
The regular checkpoint/restart technique can also be applied to the tridiagonal
reduction algorithm, but no implementation has been done.
The Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) technique is a narrow spectrum
fault tolerance method. When applicable ABFT can provide failure protection for the
target algorithm at extremely low cost. Huang and Abraham [55] first used ABFT
to protect matrix-matrix multiply. The basic idea is to encode the input matrices A,
B and C with checksums, the checksums are appended to the input matrices to form
extended input matrices. The matrix-matrix multiply is carried out as usual on the
extended input matrices. Based on the proof in their chapter, the checksums in the
resulting extended matrix are still valid checksums. Based on this valid checksum
relationship, faults can be detected and corrected. Later the ABFT technique for
LU, QR and Cholesky factorizations have been developed for soft errors on systolic
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arrays. It is hard to capture the algorithm characteristics in matrix factorizations to
design algorithm based fault tolerant algorithms for them.
In recent years the ABFT technique is revisited and ABFT enabled matrix
factorizations are designed for large scale distributed supercomputers. Many of these
new ABFT algorithms are based on the ScaLAPACK package. Unlike systolic arrays,
large scale supercomputers have much more processors and each processor operates
on a data set instead of a single element as in systolic arrays. This complexity calls for
a new design of the ABFT scheme. All of the three one-sided matrix factorizations
are protected against process failures: Du [36] designed ABFT based LU and QR
factorizations, Chen [51] designed ABFT based Cholesky factorization.

4.3

Contribution

We proved the checksum relationship, designed a fault tolerant algorithm, implemented our design, and gave an analysis on the overhead of our algorithm:
• Invariant checksum relationship We proved the invariant checksum relationship throughout the factorization.
• ABFT based tridiagonal reductoin algorithm We designed a fault tolerant
tridiagonal reduction algorithm fully based on ABFT. The panel scope is also
protected by checksums.
• Overhead analysis We provided a thorough analysis on the overhead of
our fault tolerant tridiagonal reduction algorithm. The analysis shows the
asymptotic performance overhead and asymptotic storage overhead approach
0.
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4.4

Background

Before we explain our fault tolerant tridiagonal reduction algorithm, it is important to
understand how the non-fault tolerant version of the algorithm works in ScaLAPACK.

4.4.1

2D block cyclic data distribution

ScaLAPACK operates on dense matrices on distributed memory machines. Data are
stored on different processors in a two dimensional block cyclic fashion. Processors
are arranged into a two dimensional P × Q grid (P rows and Q columns). Matrices
are partitioned into blocks, these blocks are then distributed to the P × Q processor
grid in a 2D block cyclic manor as shown in Figure 4.1. In this example the available
processors are arranged into a 2 × 3 processor grid, each color represents a different
processor. Figure 4.1(a) shows the global view of the matrix when it is distributed
over a 2 × 3 process grid. Figure 4.1(b) shows each process’s view of the data. Data
blocks owned by one processor are assembled to a local matrix, this local matrix is
stored contiguously in each process’s memory. Each process stores a matrix descriptor,
based on this descriptor a process can compute the global position of a local data block
given its local position. Global position can be converted to local position based on
this descriptor. 2D block cyclic data distribution scheme has several advantages [8].
Firstly, it has good load balancing properties. Matrix data are distributed evenly
across all available processors. As the computation proceeds, data participating in the
computation are still evenly distributed. Secondly, this distribution scheme enables
the use of Level 3 BLAS on the local matrix. Level 3 BLAS operations are well
optimized and has the highest flop:word ratio. Lastly, this distribution scheme has
good scaling properties.
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(a) Matrix View

(b) Process View

Figure 4.1: A matrix mapped to a 2 × 3 process grid.

4.4.2

Tridiagonal Reduction

The tridiagonal reduction algorithm of a dense matrix is used in solving the symmetric
eigenvalue problem.

Solving the symmetric eigenvalue problem Ax = λx (A is

symmetric) means to find the decomposition A = QΛQ−1 where Λ is diagonal with
Λii being the i-th eigenvalue of A, Q is composed of the eigenvectors of A with Q(:, i)
being the eigenvector associated with Λi . A = QΛQ−1 is also called the spectral
decomposition of A. The symmetric eigenvalue problem can be solved using the
power method or the QR algorithm. These two methods are usually too expensive in
practice. So instead, an adapted QR algorithm is commonly used. First the matrix A
is reduced to tridiagonal form using orthogonal similarity transformation U T AU = T .
Similarity transformations preserve eigenvalues, so T has the same eigenvalues as A.
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the tridiagonal form T can be found much more
easily than the eigenvalues and the eigenvectors of A [73, p. 119]. Then it is easy to
compute the eigenvectors of the original matrix A using U and the eigenvectors of T .
The reduction of matrix A to tridiagonal form can be achieved using Householder
reflections. We can find a Householder matrix U1 so that A1 = U1T AU1 is tridiagonal
in the first column and the first row. We continue this process and find a sequence
of Householder matrices U2 , U3 , . . . Un so that (U1 U2 U3 . . . Un )T A(U1 U2 U3 . . . Un ) =
An = T is in tridiagonal form. Implementing this process on a computer yields
poor performance because it involves a lot of matrix-vector multiplies. Matrix-vector
multiply is a BLAS 2 operation which have low performance on computers with a
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hierarchical memory system. ScaLAPACK’s tridiagonal reduction routine PDSYTRD
implements a blocked version of the aforementioned Householder transformation
method.

4.4.3

Blocked tridiagonal reduction

ScaLAPACK implements blocked version of the tridiagonal reduction algorithm. The
blocked version is rich in BLAS 3 operations which have high flop:word ratios and
are highly optimized on common computer architectures. In the blocked version, the
input matrix A is partitioned into block columns of width nb. Householder reflectors
from nb columns are accumulated then applied to the trailing matrix all at once.
Algorithm 4 is the ScaLAPACK tridiagonal reduction algorithm. PDSYTRD
Algorithm 4 PDSYTRD
1: for every panel do
2:
PDLATRD on the panel, return V and W
3:
PDSYR2K: trail(A) = trail(A) − V W > − W V T
4: end for
reduces a panel of nb columns of A to tridiagonal form. PDSYR2K performes a rank
2 update on the trailing submatrix. Algorithm 5 shows the operations performed by
PDSYTRD. Figure 4.2 shows the memory footprint of one iteration of Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 5 PDLATRD
1: for the i-th column of the panel P (i from 1 to nb) do
2:
Compute the Householder vector vi which annihilates P (i + 2 : end, i)
3:
Compute
T
T
xi = τ (A(1) vi − Wi−1 (Vi−1
vi ) − Vi−1 (Wi−1
vi ))
T
4:
Compute wi = xi − τ vi (vi xi )/2
5:
If i < nb, update the i + 1-th column of P
6: end for
Figure 4.2(a) is the beginning the iteration. PDSYTRD takes advantage of the
symmetry of A, only the lower triangular part of A is accessed and modified. The
strictly upper triangular part of A (light blue) is not accessed by PDSYTRD and
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remains unchanged through out the factorization. The green part is the factorized
part, the red part on the right is the trailing matrix to be factorized. Figure 4.2(b) is
the panel factorization. A panel of nb columns is reduced to tridiagonal form. The
green part inside the panel stores the Householder vectors. Figure 4.2(c) is the rank
2 update to the trailing matrix. Taking advantage of the symmetry of the trailing
matrix, only the lower triangular part is read and modified. Figure 4.2(d) is the state
of the matrix at end of the iteration. This state is similar to the state at the beginning
of the iteration, only that now the trailing matrix is nb columns smaller than that at
the beginning of the iteration.

PDSYTRD

PDSYTRD
PDSYR2K

(a) Beginning of iteration (b) Factorize the panel

(c) Rank 2 update

(d) End of iteration

Figure 4.2: One iteration of PDSYTRD

4.4.4

Failure model

Failures encountered in computer systems can be caused by various sources. They
could be caused by hardware failures, software faults, cosmos rays or system
overheating. Regardless of the cause, based on the effect of the failure we divide
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Figure 4.3: Global view of the matrix when a process fails.
failures into two categories: hard errors and soft errors. If a failure is perment (process
crash, hardware malfunctional) and will be noticed by the system, we consider this
failure a hard error. If a failure is transient and goes unnoticed by the system, we
consider the failure a soft error. In this chapter we deal with hard errors.
In the case of PDSYTRD, a process failure will cause the data residing in that
process to be lost. Figure 4.3 shows the status of the matrix in Figure 4.1(a) when
one process fails. A White bloc with a question mark in it is a lost data block after
the process fails. At this point the runtime is notified that a process has been lost.
Measures have to be taken in order to proceed with the computation.

4.5

The Fault Tolerant Algorithm

In this section we describe our fault tolerant tridiagonal reduction algorithm. The
main idea of our algorithm is to append checksums to the original matrix. These
checksums can be updated through meaningful mathematical operations, so the
checksums can be maintained with very little overhead.

4.5.1

Initial checksum setup

In our algorithm we use two sets of checksums: column checksums at the bottom
and row checksums on the right. The checksums are appended to the input matrix
to form an extended matrix. The extended matrix is distributed over the original
process grid in the 2D block cyclic fashion. In this layout, the distribution of the
57

original matrix data is exactly the same as in the case without the checksum data. In
other words, if a process is assigned some data blocks of the matrix data in the stock
ScaLAPACK PDSYTRD routine, this process will be assigned exactly the same
data blocks of the original matrix plus some checksum blocks in our fault tolerant
algorithm. Figure 4.4 shows the arrangement of the checksums of a matrix distributed
over a 2 × 3 process grid. Colored blocks in the two graphs are data blocks belonging
to the original matrix, white blocks are checksums appended to the original matrix.
In Figure 4.4(a) is the global view of the extended matrix. In the global view the
checksum blocks are located to the right and at the bottom of the original matrix.
In this small example the number of checksum blocks seems relatively big comparing
with the number of data blocks in the original matrix. But we will explain later that
the proportion of the checksum blocks decreases to negligible when the process grid
increases. The way the row checksums are calculated is as following: the first data
block belonging to the same block row on each process are added together elementwise to form a checksum block. This checksum block is duplicated and stored next to
itself. Since the checksum blocks are also distributed in the 2D block cyclic fashion,
keeping two copies of the same checksum block next to each other ensures that these
two checksum blocks will be assigned to two different processes. The benefit of this
is that if one copy of the checksum block is lost due to a process failure, we still have
another copy. Figure 4.4(b) shows the matrix from each process’s perspective. In
addition to the original matrix data (colored blocks), each process is assigned some
checksum blocks (white blocks). Again, in this small example the checksum blocks
seem a lot compared to the original blocks. But in reality when the process grid is
large and the input matrix is large, the proportion of the checksums becomes very
small.
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copy

sum
sum

copy
(a) Matrix View

(b) Process View

Figure 4.4: An encoded matrix mapped to a 2 × 3 process grid.
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4.5.2

The fault tolerant algorithm

If a matrix is distributed over a process grid of size P × Q where P is the number of
rows and Q is the number of columns of the process grid, and the current iteration
is factorizing the i-th block column, we define the panel scope as the group of Q
block columns from the b Qi c-th block column to the (b Qi c + Q − 1)-th block column.
Algorithm 6 shows our fault tolerant tridiagonal reduction algorithm. Line 1 computes
the initial row checksums and column checksums. Before the factorization starts, the
matrix is a symmetric matrix, the upper triangular part contains valid data. The
initial checksum calculation is based on the entire matrix. After the factorization
starts, the upper part of the matrix is not modified, it contains invalid data. But
the checksums are updated in such a way that the checksums still encodes the entire
symmetric matrix. That is to say if we replace the invalid upper triangular part of
the matrix with valid data then compute the checksums, the checksum will equal the
checksums we keep at the bottom of the matrix. Starting from line 2 the algorithm
enters the factorization-update loop. In line 3 each process which owns a block
column of the panel scope makes a local copy of that block column. This local
copy will be used to recover lost data blocks inside the panel scope. Line 4 calls
FT-PDLATRD to factorize the panel. FT-PDLATRD is a modified version of
the stock PDLATRD routine in ScaLAPACK. It does everthing PDLATRD does,
it also generates the checksums for the output V and W . We denote V and the
checksums of V together as Vc . Similarly we denote W and the checksums of W
together as Wc . Line 5 through line 7 recover from failures occurred during the panel
factorization. Line 8 calls FT-PDSYR2K to apply a rank-2 update to the trailing
matrix Ae . If a process failure occurs, line 9 through line 11 calls the routine Recover
to recover data lost due to the failure.
Algorithm 7 is our modified panel factorization routine. It is very similar to the
stock PDLATRD routine. The difference is that when computing the Householder
vectors, FT-PDLATRD also scales the checksum part of the column so that the
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resulting vi is checksum protected. The output W is also checksum protected when
FT-PDLATRD finishes. Notice that the checksums of V and W are updated
through mathematical operations (GEMV and vector scaling). This approach to
get the checksums is highly efficient comparing with performing a global reduction
on the current panel.
Algorithm 6 Fault Tolerant Tridiagonal Reduction
1: Calculate the column checksum of the input matrix A, get Ae
N
2: for each i in d nb
e iterations do
3:
Each process which owns part of the current panel makes a local copy of its
own part of the panel
4:
Call FT-PDLATRD on the panel, return Vc and Wc
5:
if failure occurs then
6:
Call Recover to recover from the failure
7:
end if
8:
Call FT-PDSYR2K, apply a block rank-2 update:
(i+1)
(i)
Ae
= A e − V c W T − Wc V T
9:
if failure occurs then
10:
Call Recover to recover from the failure
11:
end if
12: end for

Algorithm 7 FT-PDLATRD
1: for the i-th column of the panel P (i from 1 to nb) do
2:
Compute the Householder vector vi which annihilates P (i + 2 : N, i)
3:
Update the checksum of the i-th column P (N + 1 : end, i)
4:
Compute
(xe )i =
(1)
T
T
τ (Ae vi − (We )i−1 (Vi−1
vi ) − (Ve )i−1 (Wi−1
vi ))
T
5:
Compute (we )i = (xe )i − τ (ve )i (vi xi )/2
6:
If i < nb, update the i + 1-th column of P
7: end for

4.5.3

The invariant checksum relationship

In this section we prove the invariant checksum relationship which is the foundation
of our ABFT algorithm.
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Theorem 2. The column checksums for block columns are valid at the end of each
iteration.
Proof. We use the phrase current panel to refer to the block column currently being
factorized in the iteration. Our proof is based on mathematical induction. The proof
uses Algorithm 6 as a reference. e is an all-one column vector (1, 1, . . . , 1).
1. Before the factorization the checksum blocks at the bottom of the original
matrix are valid, because they are newly computed.
2. Assume the checksum blocks are valid before Algorithm 6 enters the i-th
factorize-update loop, the checksum blocks are still valid before it enters the
(i + 1)-th factorize-update loop.
(a) In the factorize-update loop, when the panel factorization is finished
(line 4), the checksum blocks at the bottom are valid. The checksum
blocks for the current panel have been updated to be valid according to
Algorithm 7. The checksum blocks at the bottom for the trailing matrix
have not been modified since the last iteration, so they are also valid.
(b) After the rank-2 update to the trailing matrix, the checksum blocks at the
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bottom of the trailing matrix are still valid.
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3. By mathematical induction the checksum blocks are valid at the end of each
factorize-update iteration.

4.5.4

Protecting the upper triangular matrix

In PDSYTRD the strictly upper triangular matrix is not accessed. On exit, the
upper triangular matrix contains the same data as on entrance. In our fault tolerant
algorithm we also maintain this behavior. This is where checksums on the right side
come into the play. Before the factorization starts, we compute row-wise checksum
blocks and store the checksum blocks on the right side of the original matrix. These
checksum blocks only encodes the strictly upper triangular part of the matrix, each
checksum block is duplicated and two copies of the same checksum block are stored
next to each other horizontally. These checksum blocks are not accessed or changed

63

once they are computed. Once an failure occurs, a simple subtraction can recover the
lost data block in the input matrix.

4.5.5

Recovery

At the end of the i-th iteration the state of the data matrix and the state of the
checksum blocks are shown in Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6(a) is the state of the data matrix.
The green part is the factorized part, it contains the Householder vectors. The light
blue area is the untouched part. The red part is the trailing matrix. Figure 4.6(b)
shows the left part of the bottom checksum blocks. The gray area at the bottom
is the checksum blocks. The boxed gray area encodes the boxed green part. In
Figure 4.6(c) the boxed gray part mathematically encodes the boxed the red part. In
the ScaLAPACK implementation only the lower triangular of the boxed red part is
stored. Figure 4.6(d) shows the checksum blocks on the right of the matrix encoding
the upper triangular part of the data matrix. These checksum blocks are computed
and written once, they are never changed ever since.
We partition the matrix into three areas (see Fgure 4.5) based on the state of the
matrix. Each area needs to be treated differently in failure recovery. When a process

Area%1%

Area%3%

Area%2%

Figure 4.5: Partition for recovery
failure occurs, the Recovery procedure goes as follows:
1. Recover the runtime. Replace the dead process with a substitute process.
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2. If any checksum block is lost, recover it using the other copy of the lost checksum
block.
3. For area 1:
(a) If the failure occurred during the panel factorization, all processes who
own part of the current panel recover the lost blocks in the snapshot.
The snapshot is checksum protected, so the lost blocks can be recovered
using the checksums. Then copy the snapshot into the data matrix and
re-factorize the panel. Recover the rest of area 1 using the checksums on
the bottom.
(b) If the failure did not occurred during the panel factorization, recover lost
data blocks in area 1 using the checksums on the bottom.
4. For area 2, use the checksum blocks on the bottom to recover lost data blocks in
area 2. The checksums on the bottom of area 2 encodes area 2 and the transpose
of area 2. The algorithm retrieves data blocks from the lower triangular matrix
to fill in the data blocks in the upper triangular matrix (see Figure 4.7). Then
the checksums on the bottom can be used to recover the missing data block
(the white block in Figure 4.7(b)).
5. Fore area 3, use the checksum blocks on the right to recover lost data blocks
belonging to area 3.
When we say recover a lost data block using the checksum block, we mean to first
compute a new partial checksum of the data blocks on the live processes, then the lost
data blocks can be obtained by subtracting the partial checksum from the checksum
maintained during the factorization.
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(a) End of iteration

(b) Checksums for V

(c) Checksums for the
traling matrix

(d) Checksums for the upper
triangular part

Figure 4.6: State of the matrix after the i-th iteration

Area%2%

(a) One block lost in Area 2 (b) Copy blocks from the
lower triangle

Figure 4.7: Partition for recovery
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4.6

Complexity analysis

We analyze the complexity of the fault tolerant tridiagonal reduction algorithm
in three aspects: storage overhead, communication overhead, and computation
overhead.
In this section, N is the size of the input matrix. nb is the blocking factor in the
2D block cyclic data distribution. P is the number of rows in the processor grid, Q
is the number of columns in the process grid.
Storage cost comes from the space for the checksum blocks, the storage for the
snapshot of the current panel scope, and the storage for the buffer used in step 4 of
the Recovery process.
The amount of storage for the checksum blocks at the bottom is


N
2
nb

 
N 2
nb
P
nb

The amount of storage on the right of the input matrix is

2

   

N
N
N
+2
/Q nb 2
P
nb
nb
nb

The amount of storage for the snapshot is at most

   
N
P nb Qnb
N +2
nb
Adding them all together we have the total amount of extra storage:
2

N2
N2
N2
N Qnb
+2
+4
+ N Qnb + 2
P
Q
PQ
P

If we compute the ratio between the extra storage needed by the fault tolerant
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algorithm and the storage needed by the non fault tolerant algorithm, we get:
2
4
Qnb 2Qnb
2
+ +
+
+
P
Q PQ
N
NP
The blocking factor nb is a relatively small number (in the hundreds). The number
of rows P and the number of columns Q are close to each other, and they are smaller
than N by several orders of magnitude. So we can denote the storage overhead as:

O

1
1
1
Q
1
+ +
+
+
P
Q PQ N
N



The biggest term Q/N comes from the snapshot for the current panel scope. The
total asymptotic storage overhead is very small.
The sources of computation overhead comes including generating the initial
checksums, maintaining the checksums, and computation involved in the recovery
procedure.
The initial checksum generation costs
N2
(P − 1)
P
FLOPS. The additional FLOPS caused by updating the checksums during the panel
factorization is
N
−1 
dX

P e
N
2
− bi/P c · nb [2 (N − i · nb) − 1]
P
i=0
N
−1 
dX

P e
N
+ 2
2
− bi/P c · nb (2nb − 1)
P
i=0

=

4N 3
+ O(N 2 )
3P nb

The additional computation needed to maintain the checksum blocks at the
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bottom is

2·

N
−1
dX
P e


2·2

i=0


N
− bi/P c · nb [(N − i · nb)] nb
P

N
−1 
dX

P e


N
+
2
− bi/P c · nb (N − i · nb)
P
i=0

=

(8nb + 2)N 3
+ O(N 2 )
3P nb

Adding these two costs together we have the total computation cost to maintain the
checksum blocks at the bottom of the original matrix:
(8nb + 6)N 3
+ O(N 2 )
3P nb
The additional FLOPS involved in recovering from a failure is N 2 .
The computation complexity of the original parallel tridiagonal reduction algorithm is 4/3N 3 FLOPS. So the computation overhead of the fault tolerant algorithm
is:
(2nb + 3)
+O
2P nb



1
N



1
3
= +
+O
P
2P nb



1
N



As the number of process rows increases, the ratio of the computation overhead
diminishes.
The extra communication caused by the fault tolerant algorithm only contains two
components: communication during the initial checksum setup and communication
during the recovery from a failure. The amount of data transferred between processes
is N 2 , the entire matrix. Each process owns N/(nb · P ) block rows. Assuming the
time cost to perform a reduction operation on one block row among the P processes
in the same process column is TP , the total time cost to generate the initial checksums
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is
TP · N
nb · P
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Chapter 5
Hessenberg Reduction with
Transient Error Resilience on
GPU-Based Hybrid Architectures
5.1

Introduction

A transient error is an error in a signal or data element which is temporary, and
caused by factors other than permanent component failures. Many phenomena have
been blamed for transient errors, ranging from alpha particles from package decay, to
cosmic rays and thermal neutrons. Cosmic rays were shown to be the most prevalent
source of transient errors among these sources [96]. While transient errors may happen
at different levels in the hardware hierarchy, such as communication links or digital
logic, the most common situation is in the semiconductor storage.
Both GPUs and traditional CPUs, and their associated memory, are prone to
transient errors.

CPU designs increasingly scale the number of cores and the

memory hierarchies in order to provide more processing ability. Along with increasing
transistor density, newer CPU designs also adopt faster clock frequency and lower
voltage.

More transistors per unit area means the size of each transistor gets
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smaller. A smaller feature size, combined with lower voltage to maintain transistor
states, makes the transistor state easier to change, and therefore more vulnerable
to external factors that might change the state. The critical charge Qcrit , which is
the lowest electron charge needed to change the logical level, decreases as the chip
feature size decreases. Higher transistor density also causes higher heat density which
brings more thermal neutrons which contribute to transient errors as well. General
Purpose Graphics Processing Units (GPGPUs) are gaining popularity in the scientific
computing community due to the sizable acceleration they provide to computation
intensive applications. A significant percentage of the acceleration is due to the
large amount of data processing transistors inside the GPGPUs, where the number
of transistors follow a even more drastic increase than in the CPU. As the evolution
of the conventional processors and accelerators follows similar trends, the presence
and frequency of transient errors have comparable progression and identical effect,
becoming a disturbance to application developers.
Transient errors are also becoming a challenge for the applications. Both CPU
main memory and GPU memory are DRAMs (Dynamic Random-access Memory).
The measurement unit of soft error rate (SER) is Failure in time (FIT), and one FIT
is one soft error in 109 device hours. Baumann [4] has reported that the SER of
DRAM is between 1k FIT/chip - 10K FIT/chip range, and stays at the same level
over 7 generations of DRAMs. Similarly, Jacob et al. [56] reported that at the 130
nm process SRAM memory exhibits a 100k FIT/chip. Michalak et al. [70] reported
that the ASC Q supercomputer at Los Alamos National Laboratory experienced an
average of 51.7 soft errors per week over a period of 7 weeks from September 2004
to October 2004. More recently, Haque et al. [52] assessed the probability of soft
errors in NVIDIA GPUs using a benchmark called MemtestG80. They ran the test
on 50000 GPUs and found that about 60% of the GPUs have a soft error probability
(per test iteration) higher than 1 × 10−5 .
Useful science is based on facts, on experiments that can be replicated and results
that can be trusted and verified. A single soft error can have a major impact on
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the outcome of any computation as it can drastically alter the results, and thus
the understanding of the analyzed phenomenon. In the extremely volatile execution
environments we will encounter in the very near future, it is critical that the pillar of
scientific applications, the notion of trust in the scientific outcome, is not undermined.
This requires the data and the result to be carefully validated to ensure it matches the
experiment, and it has not been altered during the computational phase. Ensuring
this property is a difficult task if we are bound to generic methodologies. Fortunately,
some of the most widely used algorithms have inherently properties that can be
advantageously exploited in fulfilling this need.
In this chapter, we design and implement a soft error resilient Hessenberg
reduction algorithm for GPU enabled hybrid architectures. We take advantage of
diskless checkpointing, ABFT, and reverse computation techniques to achieve soft
error resilience while introducing very little overhead compared to the non fault
tolerant Hessenberg reduction.

We further minimize the overhead by carefully

overlapping workloads on the host side and the GPU side. Unlike the post-processing
scheme for LU and QR in [37, 38, 39], our algorithm detects soft errors at the end
of each iteration. Once detected, the errors are corrected right away, preventing
the errors from propagating and contaminating other matrix elements. While the
above mentioned post-processing scheme can only correct up to two soft errors total
during the course of the entire LU or QR factorization, our fault tolerant Hessenberg
algorithm can detect and correct more than one simultaneous soft error, assuming
that the error positions in the matrix do not form a rectangle. Once the algorithm
has corrected the simultaneous errors, it continues as normal and is ready to detect
and correct subsequent soft errors as they occur.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 we survey
related work, then in Section 5.3 we explain the Hessenberg reduction algorithm and
its implementation in the MAGMA framework. Section 5.4 describes our soft error
resilient hybrid Hessenberg reduction algorithm in detail. Section 5.5 gives a formal
analysis on the performance overhead of the fault tolerant algorithm. Section 5.6
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presents the experiment results of the algorithm and provides a theoretical analysis
for the performance. Section 5.7 summarizes our work.

5.2

Related work

Plank et al. [60] presented a fault tolerant technique based on checksum and reverse
computation for matrix computations on networks of workstations (NOWs). Their
scheme tackles node failures instead of soft errors. A checksum of each processor’s
local matrix data is stored in main memory and regenerated periodically. When a
node failure happens, the live processors reverse the computations that occurred after
the failure so that the matrix data and the checksum are consistent with each other.
Then the lost data on the failed processor are recovered using the checksum and
the data on the live processors. Chen and Abraham [25] devised methods to detect
and locate faulty processors in the computation of eigenvalues and singular values on
systolic arrays. Their methods take the special properties of eigenvalue computation
and singular value computation into consideration to make the detection of errors
very efficient.
While the field of fault tolerance was dominated for years by solutions to address
hard errors, with the increase in the number of computing components, the impact of
soft errors has attracted significant attention, especially in linear algebra. Based on
the ABFT idea [54, 64, 65], Du et al. [37, 38] proposed an algorithm to tolerate soft
errors in the High Performance LINPACK Benchmark (HPL) [33]. Their approach
can compute the correct solution vector to Ax = b in the presence of one or two soft
errors over the course of the factorization. Du et al. [39] also designed a scheme to
tolerate soft errors in the QR factorization on hybrid systems with GPGPUs. At
most, one soft error can be tolerated in this fault tolerant hybrid QR algorithm.
Both the HPL fault tolerant scheme and QR fault tolerant scheme adopt a post
processing approach in which the erroneous result is corrected through post processing
after the regular factorization. Bronevetsky and Supinski [18] studied the impact of
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soft errors on iterative linear algebra methods. They found that iterative methods
are vulnerable to soft errors as well and exhibit poor soft error detection abilities.
In [81], Shantharam et al. analyzed the propagation pattern of soft errors in iterative
methods by modeling the iterative process with a sequence of sparse matrix-vector
multiplication (SpMV) operations. In [82], Shantharam et al. proposed a soft error
tolerant preconditioned conjugate gradient algorithm for sparse linear systems. Their
method adapted the algorithm based fault tolerance technique to sparse linear systems
and achieved an overhead of 11.3% when no soft error occurs. Chen and Abraham [25]
designed a concurrent error detection scheme for transient errors in the computation
of eigenvalues on systolic processor arrays using the QR algorithm [47, 85] (not to
be confused with the QR factorization). Cao et al. [20] designed a soft error resilient
task-based runtime with three options to achieve fault tolerance.
In [75] Plank et al. first introduced the idea of diskless checkpointing which
eliminates the disk access bottleneck in the traditional checkpointing technique. In
the traditional checkpointing technique, checkpoints are stored to secondary stable
memory, usually in the form of hard drives. Since disk accesses are very slow compared
to floating point computation, frequently writing checkpoints to disk incurs a big
overhead. With diskless checkpoint, the checkpoints are stored in main memory
instead of hard disk. Main memory access is much faster than hard drive access, so
diskless checkpointing can greatly reduce the memory access overhead.
Jia et al.

proposed a fault tolerant algorithm for the parallel Hessenberg

reduction [57], dealing with fail-stop scenarios (hard errors) in the context of
distributed memory machines. Process failures can be tolerated using the ABFT
technique, encoding and replicating the checksums to allow for inter-process data
recovery. Our work is different from [57] in at least three major aspects. First, our
algorithm is designed to tolerate soft errors. Soft errors are silent, they change the
content of a memory location without triggering drastic responses from the OS. Unlike
hard errors, which will be reported by the execution environment and must be dealt
with in a more holistic way, soft errors need to be actively detected and prevented from
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propagating. Second, our algorithm works on CPU-GPU hybrid platforms instead of
distributed memory machines. Third, our algorithm uses reverse computation to roll
back the trailing matrix update, making the error recovery easier and faster.
The Matrix Algebra on GPU and Multicore Architectures project (MAGMA) [88]
is a dense linear algebra library for hybrid architectures with GPUs. The library
provides equivalent functionalities to LAPACK [1] and uses block algorithms similar
to those of LAPACK. By scheduling workloads with different characteristics to CPUs
and GPUs, the hybrid algorithms are able to take advantage of both computational
units and gain considerable acceleration over their LAPACK counterparts. The hybrid
Hessenberg reduction algorithm in MAGMA also utilizes both CPUs and GPUs in
a hybrid system. This hybrid algorithm is adapted from the LAPACK algorithm in
order to separate workloads which are more suitable for GPUs from workloads that
are suitable for CPUs. Details of this hybrid algorithm will be explained in the next
section.

5.3

Hessenberg reduction on GPU enabled hybrid
architectures

In this section we describe the Hessenberg reduction algorithm and its variation as
implemented in MAGMA.

5.3.1

The Unblocked Hessenberg Reduction

A square matrix H in which all entries below the first subdiagonal are zeros is said
to be in upper Hessenberg matrix form. Reduction of a square matrix A to the
Hessenberg form H is an important intermediate step in the Hessenberg QR algorithm
which is used to compute the eigenvalues of A. Given a square matrix A, we apply a
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sequence of orthogonal similarity transformations Qi to A:
−1
−1 −1
H = Q−1
n Qn−1 · · · Q2 Q1 AQ1 Q2 · · · Qn−1 Qn

let Q = Q1 Q2 · · · Qn−1 Qn , we have:
H = Q−1 AQ = QT AQ.
Qi is chosen to be the Householder reflector, which eliminates the elements below the
−1
first subdiagonal in the i-th column of Q−1
i−1 · · · Q1 AQ1 · · · Qi−1 .

5.3.2

The Blocked Hessenberg Reduction

The speed of the unblocked Hessenberg reduction algorithm on modern computers is
constrained by the latency of memory accesses. The blocked Hessenberg reduction
algorithm [76] greatly increased the arithmetic intensity by grouping nb Householder
reflectors and applying the group to A at the same time.
U1 = Q1 Q2 · · · Qnb = I − V T V T
where I is the identity matrix, V is an N × nb matrix composed of the Householder
vectors, and T is an nb × nb upper triangular matrix. This representation of U1 is
called the compact WY representation [79]. This representation requires less storage
to store U1 and enables the use of matrix-matrix multiplications in the factorization.
Matrix-matrix multiplications are desirable because of their high arithmetic intensity
and efficient implementation on modern computers with hierarchical memory systems.
Algorithm 8 shows the blocked Hessenberg reduction algorithm as implemented in
the LAPACK DGEHRD routine. trail(A) means the trailing submatrix in that
iteration.
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Algorithm 8 Blocked Hessenberg Reduction
N
e do
1: for i from 1 to d nb
2:
DLAHRD, return V, T and Y where Y = AV T
3:
DGEMM: trail(A) = trail(A) − Y V >
4:
DLARFB: trail(A) = trail(A) − V T > V > trail(A)
5: end for

5.3.3

Hessenberg Reduction in MAGMA

The hybrid Hessenberg reduction algorithm in MAGMA is an adapted version of
Algorithm 8. Algorithm 9 shows the pseudocode for the hybrid Hessenberg reduction
algorithm [89]. The input matrix A is stored in LAPACK layout, and matrix elements
are stored contiguously in column major format. The matrix is logically divided into
block columns, each block column is of size N × nb. Upon completion, the matrix
entries below the first subdiagonal are overwritten with the final Q matrix and the
upper part of the matrix is overwritten with the final H matrix. The hybrid algorithm
executes all the updates to the trailing matrix on the GPU. The panel factorization
is assigned to the CPU, and the next panel to be factorized is transfered back to the
host when both the right update and left update from the previous panel have been
applied to it. Line 6 is an asynchronous data transfer, and control is returned to
the CPU immediately after the data transfer is issued so that the CPU can initiate
the next computation kernel. GPUs are able to do computation in parallel with
communication, and using asynchronous data transfer hides the time cost to transfer
the upper part of the current panel back to the CPU when it is updated and will not
be modified again. The two lines in Algorithm 9, shown in red, are overlapped with
each other.
Figure 5.1 visually illustrates one iteration of Algorithm 9; the computation
routine called in each step and the data it operates on are pointed out with a black
box. Figure 5.1(a) shows the state at the beginning of this iteration. The matrix
elements in the yellow triangle and in the green trapezoid are the final results of the
Q matrix and the H matrix, and they reside on the host side and will not be modified
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again. The red rectangle is the trailing matrix which will be factorized and updated
in this iteration. The first nb columns of the red part are called a panel which will
be factorized next. Figure 5.1(b) shows the panel factorization DLAHRD which
factorizes the lower part of the current panel. The yellow upper triangular matrix
is updated and contains the final results of H. The green trapezoid contains the
Householder vectors which are the final results in the Q matrix. Upon completion of
DLAHRD, both the yellow triangle and the green trapezoid are on the host side.
Figure 5.1(c) shows the right update on M . M is the part of the matrix marked by
the black box which consists of the upper part of the current panel and the upper
part of the trailing matrix. This step corresponds to line 5 of Algorithm 9. Upon
completion of this step, the nb × nb square matrix in yellow contains the final results
of H, and it will not be modified again. This square matrix is sent back to the host
side with an asynchronous data transfer. Figure 5.1(d) shows the right update to G.
The G matrix is the lower part of the trailing matrix marked by the black box. In
figure 5.1(e) the left update to G is applied through the DLARFB call. After the
DLARFB call, the matrix A has a smaller trailing matrix to be factorized in the
next iteration. Figure 5.1(f) shows the state of the matrix at the end of this iteration.
The rectangular matrix in red is the trailing matrix.
Algorithm 9 Hybrid Hessenberg Reduction
1: Transfer matrix: A on the host → d A on the GPU
N
2: for i from 1 to d nb
e do
3:
Send the lower part of the next panel P to the host.
4:
MAGMA DLAHR2, return V, T and Y
where Y = [P, G]V T
5:
DGEMM: M = M − M V T V >
6:
Send the leftmost nb columns of M to the host asynchronously.
7:
DGEMM: G = G − Y V >
8:
DLARFB: trail(A) = trail(A) − V T > V > trail(A)
9: end for
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DLAHRD

(a) Beginning of iter- (b) Factorize
ation
panel P

the

DGEMM

DLAHRD

DLAHRD

DGEMM

(c) Right update to (d) Right update to G
M

DLAHRD

DLARFB

(e) Left update to G

(f) End of iteration

Figure 5.1: One iteration of DGEHRD

5.4

Soft error resilient Hessenberg reduction algorithm

5.4.1

Failure Model

In this work we consider soft errors, which are temporary faults in the data matrix,
where the factorization is oblivious to the error and continues as usual. Without loss
of generality, we assume only one error happens at a single point in time.
In the MAGMA Hessenberg reduction algorithm, both the CPU and GPU carry
out computation. The CPU is responsible for the panel factorization, and the GPU is
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responsible for the trailing matrix update. Both the CPU memory and GPU memory
contain part of the final result or intermediate data that are used to compute the
final result. The lower triangular matrix to the left of the current panel on the host
side contains part of the final result of the Q matrix. The upper triangular matrix
to the left of the current panel on the host side contains the final result of the H
matrix. On the GPU, the rectangular matrix to the right of the current panel contains
intermediate data that will be used to compute Q and H. Soft errors in either one
of these parts will cause the factorization to give an incorrect result. We need to
detect and correct soft errors in both the CPU memory and the GPU memory. The
algorithm we propose in this work combines the advantage of the ABFT technique and
the diskless checkpointing technique. The algorithm also uses reverse computation to
roll back the program data to a previous state.
Depending on the location of the soft error, an error has different impacts on
the result of the factorization. Figure 5.2 shows the impact of a soft error when it
happens in three different locations. In this example, the matrix size N is set to 158,
and the block size is 32. In all three figures, the soft error is injected when the first
iteration has finished, and the second iteration has not yet started. Figure 5.2(a) is
the partitioning of the matrix. Each of the following three figures shows the heat map
of the difference matrix between the error-free result and the result when an error has
happened during the factorization. Black means the difference is 0. Other colors mean
the difference is bigger than 0, with each color representing a magnitude range. In
Figure 5.2(b), the error occurs at location (53, 16). This location is marked by an x in
region 3 on the left in Figure 5.2(a). This error does not propagate as the factorization
proceeds. We can see that in the final result of the factorization there is still only
one incorrect element (shown as the white dot in the upper left part of the matrix).
In Figure 5.2(c), the error happens at location (31, 127). This location is marked by
an x in region 1 shown in Figure 5.2(a). This soft error propagates row-wise, and
pollutes the entire row in H when the factorization completes. In Figure 5.2(d), the
error occurs at location (63, 127). This location is marked by an x in region 2, shown
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Figure 5.2: Propagation pattern of errors at different locations
in Figure 5.2(a). An error in this region causes the most damage among the three
scenarios. When the factorization completes, almost all the elements after column 32
in H are polluted, and many elements after column 32 in Q are polluted.

5.4.2

Encoding the Input Matrix

To recover from an error we need redundant information. We add redundancy to
the input matrix by appending an extra column at the right side of the matrix, and
an extra row at the bottom of the matrix. An element in the extra column is the
summation of all the elements in the same row in the input matrix. Similarly, an
element in the extra row is the summation of all the elements in the same column of
the original matrix. Figure 5.3 shows the initial state of the encoded input matrix.
We define the following notations: Ar chk is the column of row checksums on the
right side of the original matrix; Ac chk is the row of column checksums at the bottom
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Column of row checksums

Row of column checksums

Figure 5.3: The encoded initial matrix
of the original matrix. Are is the original matrix appended with Ar chk on the right
side (re for rowwise encoded ). Ace is the original matrix appended with Ac chk at the
bottom (ce for columnwise encoded ). Afe is the original matrix appended with both
Ar chk and Ac chk (fe for fully encoded ).

5.4.3

The Fault Tolerant Algorithm

In this subsection we present and explain our soft error tolerant Hessenberg reduction
algorithm. e is an all one vector: e = (1, 1, · · · , 1, 1)> . Algorithm 10 is the pseudocode
for the fault tolerant algorithm.
The input matrix resides on the host side when the algorithm begins; in
Algorithm 10 line 1 sends the input matrix to the GPU. Line 2 encodes the input
matrix to obtain Afe . Starting from line 3 the algorithm enters a for loop, this for
loop iterates over the block columns of A. In each loop the algorithm first sends the
lower part (the part marked by the black box in Figure 5.4(b)) of the next panel to
the CPU from the GPU in line 4. In line 6 and line 7 the algorithm computes the
column checksums for matrix Y and matrix V . This procedure requires two GEMV
operations on the GPU. Line 8 applies the right update to matrix Mre . This line
corresponds to Figure 5.4(c), and matrix Mre is the matrix marked by the black box
in the figure. Line 9 and line 10 (in red text) overlap with each other. Line 10
applies the right update to matrix G. This corresponds to Figure 5.4(d). Line 11
applies the left update from the panel to matrix G, and this operation is illustrated
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Algorithm 10 Fault Tolerant Hybrid Hessenberg Reduction
1: Transfer matrix: A on the host → d A on the GPU
2: Encode the input matrix, expand it with a checksum column and a checksum
row.
N
3: for i from 1 to d nb
e do
4:
Send the lower part of the next panel P to the host.
5:
MAGMA DLAHR2, return V, T and Y
where Y = [P, G]V T
6:
Obtain Yce by computing the column checksums of Y :
Ychk c = trail(A)chk c · V
7:
Obtain Vce by computing the column checksums of V : Vchk c = e> · V
8:
DGEMM: Mre = Mre − M V T Vce>
9:
Send the leftmost nb columns of M to the host asynchronously.
10:
DGEMM: Gfe = Gfe − Yce Vce>
> >
11:
DLARFB: trail(A)
P fe = trail(A)fe −PVce T V trail(A)
12:
Compute Sre =
Are (i) and Sce =
Ace (i)
13:
if |Sre − Sce | > threshold then
14:
Reverse the last left update and right update.
15:
Correct the error.
16:
end if
17: end for
in Figure 5.4(e).
We prove that, after line 11 in Algorithm 10, the column of row checksums and
the row of column checksums are still valid for the yellow part and the red part in
Figure 5.4(f). The proof is presented in the next subsection.
Line 12 through line 16 check for the existence of a soft error. The algorithm
corrects the error if there is any. Line 12 computes the summations of the checksum
row and the checksum column. Since they contain checksums of the same matrix
data along different directions, the summation of each vector should equal each other.
Taking rounding errors into consideration, we check the difference against a threshold.
If the difference exceeds the threshold, we consider an error has happened. The
threshold should be big enough to tolerate roundoff errors, at the same time it should
be small enough to avoid false negatives. A proper choice of the threshold is a value
larger than the machine epsilon by 2 to 3 orders of magnitude. At this point the soft
error in the matrix element has propagated to both the checksum column and the
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Figure 5.4: One iteration of FT DGEHRD
checksum row, the checksums are not valid any more. Line 14 reverses the last left
update and the last right update so that the checksum column and the checksum row,
together with the matrix data, are restored to their states at the end of the previous
iteration. The checksum relationship is made valid again. The reverse computation
is possible because the intermediate data used to apply the last last left update and
right update are still available at the end of the iteration. They will not be destroyed
until the next panel factorization. The algorithm then enters the recovery procedure.
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5.4.4

The Checksum Relationship

In this subsection we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The checksum column on the right of matrix A and the checksum row
at the bottom of matrix A are valid at the end of each iteration.
Proof.

1. The checksum column and the checksum row are valid after line 2 since

they are newly computed.
2. The checksum column and the checksum row are valid after the right update
to the trailing matrix.
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4. According to Mathematical Induction, the checksum row and the checksum
column are valid at the end of each iteration.

5.4.5

Protecting Q

The Q matrix contains the Householder vectors which were used to apply the
similarity transformations to A. These Householder vectors are not protected by the
checksums that encode the H matrix, we should provide protection for Q through
other schemes. These Householder vectors are generated on the host side and stay
there until the entire factorization finishes. They are not modified after they are
generated. Moreover, they are not even read after the iteration in which they were
generated finishes. Hence, it suffices to maintain a checksum for each row in order to
correct an error. But just like the situation in detecting a soft error in H, we need
both a checksum row and a checksum column to determine both the error column
index j and error row index i. We keep the checksums for Q on the host. Qr chk is
the rowwise checksum vector, and Qc chk is the columnwise checksum vector.
Figure 5.5 shows the process for generating and updating the checksums for the
Q matrix. The dashed line on the left of the matrix is the column of row checksums
for Q. When a new panel factorization is finished as the one shown in Figure 5.5, we
compute the row checksums for the newly finished panel. Then the partial checksums
for the panel are applied to the dashed line on the left so that the dashed line protects
the entire green part. The dashed line at the bottom of the matrix is the row of
column checksums for Q. This vector is computed segment by segment. When a new
panel factorization is done on an nb wide panel, an nb long segment of the column
checksums is also generated. The solid line segment at the bottom of the panel in
Figure 5.5 is the newly generated column checksum segment for Q. This segment is
never changed once generated.
Our algorithm overlaps the checksum generation for Q with the update to the
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Figure 5.5: Maintaining the checksums for Q
trailing matrix on the GPU. The checksum generation involves two GEMV operations.
GEMV is a level 2 BLAS operation which is a memory bound operation. We choose to
perform the checksum generation on the CPU while the GPU is updating the trailing
matrix. The CPU is idle in the non-fault tolerant MAGMA Hessenberg reduction
algorithm, and our arrangement hides the time cost of the checksum generation.

5.4.6

Recovery

Once we have detected a soft error, we first determine the row index and the column
index of the soft error before we can correct the error. We recalculate a checksum
column A0r chk and a checksum row A0c chk of the current matrix (the yellow part and
the red part in Figure 5.4(f)). Then we compare A0r chk and Ar chk , and the error row
index i can be determined if A0r chk (i) 6= Ar chk (i). Similarly, the error column index j
can be determined by comparing A0c chk and Ac chk .
The erroneous element can be corrected using the formula A(i, j) = Ar chk (i) −
Pk≤n,k6=j
P
=i
A(i, k) or the formula A(i, j) = Ac chk (j) − k≤n,k6
A(k, j).
k=1
k=1
Since a soft error in the Q matrix does not propagate, we only examine the
checksum relationship once, at the end of the factorization. The error detection
and correction scheme is similar to those for the H matrix, except that it is carried
out once at the end of the entire factorization instead of once per iteration.
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5.5

Performance Evaluation

In this section we give a formal analysis for the overhead of our fault tolerant
Hessenberg reduction algorithm. The fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm
performs extra floating point operations and extra data transfers between the host
and the GPU in addition to those in the original MAGMA Hessenberg reduction.
The fault tolerant algorithm also consumes extra storage to keep data redundancy.
So, we evaluate the overhead in terms of extra FLOPS, extra communication, and
extra storage. We denote the matrix dimension as N , the block size as nb, and the
amount of floating point operations as FLOP.
After the algorithm transfers the input matrix to the GPU, the algorithm
computes the global row checksums and the column checksums for the input matrix.
This involves two DGEMV operations on the GPU: Ar chk = Ae and Ac chk = e> A.
The amount of floating operations:
FLOPinit = 2N (N + N − 1) = 4N 2 − 2N.
In every iteration, the algorithm computes column checksums for matrix V . In the
i-th iteration, the dimension of matrix V is (N − nb · i) · nb. The accumulated FLOP
count over the course of the factorization is:
N/nb−1

FLOPchkV =

X

nb · (N − nb · i + N − nb · i − 1)

i=0

= O(N 2 ).
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The amount of floating point operations applied on the right hand side checksums is:
N/nb−1

FLOPr chk =

X

{(N − nb · i) · (nb + nb − 1)

i=0

+ N · (nb + nb − 1) + nb · [(N − nb · i) + (N − nb · i) − 1]}
= O(N 2 ).
The amount of floating point operations applied on the bottom checksums is:
N/nb−1

X

FLOPc chk =

[(N − nb · i)(nb + nb − 1)

i=0

+ (N − nb · i)(nb + nb − 1)] = O(N 2 ).
The amount of floating point operations spent on intermediate results used by both
row and column checksums is:
N/nb−1

FLOPcommon =

X

nb · (nb + nb − 1) = O(N ).

i=0

The computation cost to detect the error in Algorithm 10 requires two dot product
operations, one for the summation of the row checksums, and one for the summation
of the column checksums. The total cost is given by:
N/nb−1

FLOPD =

X

2(N + N − 1) = O(N 2 ).

i=0

Adding all these together we get the total amount of extra floating point operations
performed by the fault tolerant algorithm:
FLOPextra = FLOPinit + FLOPchkV + FLOPr chk
+ FLOPc chk + FLOPcommon + FLOPD = O(N 2 ).
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The computation complexity of the Hessenberg reduction is FLOPorig ∼ 10/3N 3 , so
when there is no errors, the overhead of the fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction in
terms of FLOP percentage is:
Overhead =

FLOPorig
O(N 2 )
3
=
= O(N −1 ).
3
FLOPextra
10/3N
10

When N increases the overhead tends to: 0.
In order to locate the error, a vector of new row checksums and a vector of new
column checksums need to be computed on the matrix consisting of the yellow part
and the red part in Figure 5.2(a). The cost is given by:
FLOPL = 2N (N + N − 1) = 4N 2 − 2N.
To correct the error requires a dot product and a subtraction:
FLOPC = N − 2 + 1 = N − 1.
After an error has been detected, the algorithm performs a roll back by reverse
update, which includes a reverse left update and a reverse right update. Then the
pre-factorized panel is retrieved from the buffer, and the entire iteration is repeated
after the error correction. The amount of overhead is a function of the size of the
trailing matrix. Assume the error occurred in the j-th iteration, and we have:
FLOPredo = FLOPrepeat + FLOPpanel
≈ N · (N − j · nb)(2nb − 1)+
(N − j · nb) · (N − j · nb)(2nb − 1)
+ (N − j · nb) · nb · [(N − j · nb) + (N − j · nb) − 1]
+ (N − j · nb) · nb · (nb + nb − 1)
= O(N 2 ).
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Table 5.1: Detailed specification of the test platform.
CPU
Processor model
Clock frequency
Memory
Peak DP
BLAS/LAPACK
OS
Compiler

GPU

Intel Xeon E5-2670 NVIDIA Tesla K40c
2.6 GHz
745 MHz
62 GB
11519 MiB
10.4 Gflop/s
1.43 Tflop/s
Intel MKL 11.2
CUBLAS 7.0.28
CentOS 6.4
gcc 4.4.7
nvcc 7.0 V7.0.27

Compared with the computation cost of the original Hessenberg reduction, the
extra FLOP introduced by the fault tolerant algorithm is very low. It tends to 0
when n increases.
The storage requirement of the fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm
consists of a panel worth of work space for the intermediate result to update the
trailing matrix, and four columns worth of space for the checksums:
S = nb · N + 4 · N

5.6

Experiments

In this section we present the performance of our fault tolerant algorithm. Our testbed
consists of an Intel Sandy Bridge-EP CPU and an NVIDIA Kepler GPU. The detailed
specifications of the test platform are listed in Table 5.1.

5.6.1

Performance Study

As shown in Figure 5.2(a), during the factorization the matrix is partitioned in three
areas. We analyze the performance of our algorithm when the soft error occurs in
each of the different areas, at different moments of the factorization.
Figure 5.6(a) shows the performance overhead in the case where the soft error
occurs in area 1 (see Figure 5.2(a)). This overhead includes setting up and maintaining
the checksums, the reverse update to the trailing matrix, and the re-execution of
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Figure 5.6: Overhead of FT-Hess. The blue line is the overhead without failures,
while the gray area is the uncertainty interval when one single error is introduced in
a specific area (as described in Figure 5.2(a)).
the faulty iteration. Among all these costs, the most expensive step is the panel
factorization when re-executing the faulty iteration. When the error occurs early in
the factorization, the size of the panel which the algorithm re-factorizes is larger, and
the performance overhead is also larger. The gray area in the figure indicates the
range of the overhead depending on the moment when the single fault is introduced
in Area 1. We can see that the overhead range remains small for all matrix sizes
while the overhead exhibits a decreasing trend as the matrix size grows; at matrix
size 10112 × 10112 the overhead is less than 4% when one error occurs in Area 1.
Figure 5.6(b) shows the performance overhead of the fault tolerant algorithm
when the soft error occurs in area 2 (see Figure 5.2(a)). Similar to Figure 5.6(a), the
overhead is dependent on the moment when the error occurs. It maintains the same
constant range and it exhibits the same decreasing trend as the matrix size grows.
The performance overhead is less than 4% at matrix size 10112 × 10112.
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Table 5.2: Numerical Stability A1, A2, A3
Matrix
MAGMA Hess
Size
1024
2048
3072
4032
5184
6016
7040
8064
9088
10112

6.2529 × 10−18
2.6291 × 10−18
8.0088 × 10−18
8.4784 × 10−18
1.2012 × 10−17
1.5892 × 10−17
1.9573 × 10−17
3.7656 × 10−18
6.3745 × 10−18
1.7536 × 10−17

FT-Hess B

Area 1
FT-Hess M

FT-Hess E

FT-Hess B

Area 2
FT-Hess M

FT-Hess E

6.2764 × 10−18
2.6552 × 10−18
8.0023 × 10−18
8.4697 × 10−18
1.2024 × 10−17
1.5881 × 10−17
1.9580 × 10−17
3.7575 × 10−18
6.3814 × 10−18
1.7531 × 10−17

6.2520 × 10−18
2.6502 × 10−18
7.9987 × 10−18
8.4747 × 10−18
1.2008 × 10−17
1.5891 × 10−17
1.9571 × 10−17
3.7690 × 10−18
6.3736 × 10−18
1.7535 × 10−17

6.2540 × 10−18
2.6276 × 10−18
8.0066 × 10−18
8.4790 × 10−18
1.2011 × 10−17
1.5892 × 10−17
1.9571 × 10−17
3.7656 × 10−18
6.3746 × 10−18
1.7536 × 10−17

6.2764 × 10−18
2.6552 × 10−18
8.0023 × 10−18
8.4697 × 10−18
1.2024 × 10−17
1.5881 × 10−17
1.9580 × 10−17
3.7575 × 10−18
6.3814 × 10−18
1.7531 × 10−17

6.2520 × 10−18
2.6502 × 10−18
7.9987 × 10−18
8.4747 × 10−18
1.2008 × 10−17
1.5891 × 10−17
1.9571 × 10−17
3.7690 × 10−18
6.3736 × 10−18
1.7535 × 10−17

6.2540 × 10−18
2.6276 × 10−18
8.0066 × 10−18
8.4790 × 10−18
1.2011 × 10−17
1.5892 × 10−17
1.9571 × 10−17
3.7656 × 10−18
6.3746 × 10−18
1.7536 × 10−17

Area 3
FT-Hess B/M/E
3.9780 × 10−16
1.6047 × 10−15
1.9576 × 10−15
1.9473 × 10−14
2.5166 × 10−15
4.3368 × 10−15
2.6158 × 10−14
8.9874 × 10−15
2.2618 × 10−14
2.4302 × 10−14

Figure 5.6(c) shows the performance overhead of the fault tolerant algorithm
when the soft error occurs in Area 3 (see Figure 5.2(a)). In this case we can see
that the performance overhead is smaller, closely following the overhead of the case
without failures. There are two reasons for this phenomenon: the error detection
and correction are only carried out once at the end of the factorization, and after an
error is detected, only a dot product is necessary to correct the error. In contrast, an
error in either area 1 or 2 requires a reverse update, a repeated panel factorization,
and a trailing matrix update.

We also observe that the uncertainty interval of

the performance overhead is very small at all matrix sizes. No matter when the
error occurred during the factorization, they are treated at the end with the same
procedure, with the same minimalistic approach. Therefore they incur the same
amount of overhead. Overall, these results indicate that our approach is a practical
solution to ensure the correctness of the Hessenberg reduction with minimal overhead,
and that this overhead consistently decreases as the size of the matrix increases. Also,
these results are consistent with the results reported in [57].

5.6.2

Numerical Stability

In this subsection we investigate the numerical behavior of our fault tolerant
Hessenberg algorithm compared with the non-fault tolerant algorithm.
The block Hessenberg reduction algorithm implemented in MAGMA is backward
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stable. The following residual is used to verify the factorization result:
r=

kA − QHQ> k1
N kAk1

where A is the input matrix, and N is the matrix dimension. Table 5.2 shows the
comparison of the residuals as obtained from the original MAGMA non-fault tolerant
algorithm and our fault tolerant algorithm with one soft error.
The three main sections of the table indicate the location of the error, Area 1, Area
2, or Area 3. In each section the letter appended to the name of the column indicates
the moment when the error occurs, B for the beginning of the factorization, M for the
middle, and finally, E for the end of the factorization. Finally, in the case of Area 3,
all columns were collapsed into a single column as the residuals were identical. We can
see that for every matrix size the residuals from Area 1 and Area 2 are on the same
order of magnitude, with minimal variations, as the original MAGMA algorithm. In
some cases the fault tolerant algorithm even has a smaller residual than the fault free
original algorithm. When the error was introduced on the left part of the matrix (i.e.,
Q, in Area 3) the final residuals are higher than their counterparts in the MAGMA
routine, but they are still within the acceptable range. The extra amount of error
compared with the classic algorithm is introduced by the encoding/recovery process.
In the encoding phase, N elements (in a row or column) are added together to form
one checksum element. In the recovery phase, N − 1 elements are subtracted from the
checksum element. Both phases are implemented as dot products. We refer interested
readers to [23] for a detailed discussion of rounding errors in dot products. Overall,
these results are evidence that our fault tolerant Hessenberg reduction algorithm
can successfully correct soft errors without degrading the stability of the original
algorithm.
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Table 5.3: Orthogonality of Q A1, A2, A3
Matrix
MAGMA Hess
Size

FT-Hess B

Area 1
FT-Hess M

FT-Hess E

FT-Hess B

Area 2
FT-Hess M

FT-Hess E

Area 3
FT-Hess

3.65 × 10−17
3.72 × 10−17
3.62 × 10−17
3.75 × 10−17
4.59 × 10−17
3.74 × 10−17
4.10 × 10−17
3.64 × 10−17
3.64 × 10−17
4.36 × 10−17

3.80 × 10−17
3.61 × 10−17
3.40 × 10−17
3.40 × 10−17
3.78 × 10−17
3.71 × 10−17
4.44 × 10−17
3.31 × 10−17
3.75 × 10−17
4.20 × 10−17

3.41 × 10−17
3.71 × 10−17
3.57 × 10−17
3.75 × 10−17
3.63 × 10−17
3.63 × 10−17
4.51 × 10−17
3.74 × 10−17
4.22 × 10−17
4.32 × 10−17

3.36 × 10−17
3.65 × 10−17
3.63 × 10−17
3.75 × 10−17
3.61 × 10−17
3.62 × 10−17
4.50 × 10−17
3.74 × 10−17
4.22 × 10−17
4.29 × 10−17

3.64 × 10−17
3.53 × 10−17
4.61 × 10−17
3.98 × 10−17
3.92 × 10−17
3.89 × 10−17
4.00 × 10−17
3.58 × 10−17
4.08 × 10−17
4.15 × 10−17

3.46 × 10−17
3.64 × 10−17
3.63 × 10−17
3.81 × 10−17
3.62 × 10−17
3.60 × 10−17
4.52 × 10−17
3.77 × 10−17
4.18 × 10−17
4.30 × 10−17

3.35 × 10−17
3.64 × 10−17
3.65 × 10−17
3.77 × 10−17
3.62 × 10−17
3.62 × 10−17
4.51 × 10−17
3.74 × 10−17
4.22 × 10−17
4.29 × 10−17

6.84 × 10−16
2.76 × 10−15
3.31 × 10−15
3.28 × 10−14
4.19 × 10−15
7.19 × 10−15
4.35 × 10−14
1.49 × 10−14
3.71 × 10−14
4.05 × 10−14

1024
2048
3072
4032
5184
6016
7040
8064
9088
10112

5.6.3

Orthogonality of Q

In this subsection we verify the orthogonality of matrix Q generated by our fault
tolerant algorithm. As explained in Subsection 5.3.1, we have H = QT AQ. Q is an
orthogonal matrix. We use the following residual to examine the orthogonality of Q:
kQQ> − Ik1
r=
.
N
I is the identity matrix, N is the matrix dimension. Table 5.3 shows the residuals
from the non-fault tolerant MAGMA algorithm and residuals from our fault tolerant
algorithm when one error occurs in different areas and different stages of the matrix.
When the soft-error occurs in Area 1 and Area 2, all residuals are on the order of
10−17 , which is the same as the residuals from the MAGMA algorithm. When the
soft-error occurs in Area 3, the residual is higher but still comparable to the residuals
from MAGMA. So the orthogonality of Q is not damaged after the recovery from an
error.

5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter we presented the design and analysis of a soft error resilient hybrid
Hessenberg reduction algorithm, an algorithm capable of taking advantage of current
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and future hybrid architectures to ensure data correctness during an entire twosided factorization.

This goal is achieved by an attentive combination of the

strengths of ABFT and diskless checkpointing to maintain data redundancy during
the factorization. From an algorithmic perspective, our algorithm detects the soft
errors on-line and corrects them before they have the opportunity to propagate to
the rest of the matrix data, minimizing the cost of the recovery process. In the case
of a soft error, our algorithm carries out a reverse computation to roll the program
data back to a consistent state and then correct the soft error. The overhead of
our approach is very low since it mainly utilizes extra computation to detect and
correct the error, and the amount of extra memory necessary for the checksum is
minimal. The performance overhead of our fault tolerant algorithm compared to
the non-fault tolerant MAGMA Hessenberg reduction reaches 1.45% when no errors
occur, and reaches 3.29% when one error occurs. Another important capability of our
fault tolerant algorithm is that it can detect and correct more than one consecutive
error, making it a potential candidate for highly volatile environments. Moreover,
the methodology highlighted in this chapter is generic enough to be applicable to the
entire spectrum of two-sided factorizations, as well as other similar algorithms. This
applicability is on our list of things to explore in the near term as we plan to provide
soft error resilience for the rest of the hybrid two-sided factorizations in MAGMA.
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Chapter 6
CPU-GPU Hybrid Bidiagonal
Reduction With Soft Error
Resilience
6.1

Introduction

Bidiagonalization of a general M × N matrix A is prerequisite to computing
the singular value decomposition (SVD) of A. The execution time of numerical
bidiagonalization on modern computers dominates the computation of SVD. Given
an M × N real matrix A, the SVD decomposition computes A = U ΣV > where U is
an M × M orthogonal matrix, Σ is an M × N diagonal matrix, and V > is an N × N
orthogonal matrix. The diagonal entries of matrix Σ are called the singular values of
A. The numerical SVD decomposition of a matrix is usually performed in two steps.
In the first step, matrix A is reduced to bidiagonal form: A = QBP > where Q is an
M × M orthogonal matrix, P is an N × N orthogonal matrix, and B is an M × N
bidiagonal matrix. In the second step, matrix B is further reduced to diagonal form.
The implementations of the steps are slow because they contain a lot of matrix-vector
multiplies (GEMV), which are Level 1 BLAS operations and have a low computation
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intensity. As a result of the above reasons, it is time consuming to calculate either of
the two stages.
Advances in Integrated Circuits (IC) manufacturing technology, described below,
bring forward higher probability of soft errors in computer systems due to decreased
feature size and increased complexity. A soft error is a temporary malfunction of a
chip element which causes a change in the program state without any notification
other than an incorrect result, but the chip element continues to function normally,
and the change in program state is unnoticed by either the hardware or the software.
Moore’s Law states that the number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles every
two years [72]. This increased transistor density on a unit silicon area provides every
more prominent possibility for soft error. Also, higher transistor density requires
smaller transistor feature size (the minimum size of a transistor or a wire on an IC),
and causes increased heat dissipation as the circuit consumes higher power. Smaller
transistors require lower voltage to operate at increasing frequencies, which makes it
easier to change the transistor state unpredictably. High heat dissipation generates
more thermal neutrons, which in turn cause more soft errors in the chip [94].
The computation needs to be protected so that there is no need to repeat the
computation in the presence of soft errors. There are a few challenges in tolerating
soft errors. First, it is difficult to detect them since a soft error changes the application
state without the hardware or software noticing it. There is no permanent physical
damage to the hardware, so the program proceeds normally in the presence of a soft
error (assuming that the soft error does not alter the control logic). Second, it is
difficult to pinpoint the error even when given the knowledge of the existence of an
error. There are a large number of transistors involved in a single computation, so
locating the error is analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. Third, suppose we
know an error exists, and we know the exact location of the error, it is still difficult
to restore the data to the correct value.
In this chapter, we propose an effective and efficient algorithm to detect, locate,
and correct soft errors in the numerical bidiagonal reduction of a real matrix.
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We employ the Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) technique and reverse
computation to achieve fault tolerance.

Our fault tolerant bidiagonal reduction

algorithm is very efficient in that it introduces very low performance overhead
compared with the non-fault tolerant counterpart. The overhead tends asymptotically
to 0 as the matrix size scales up.

We show the effectiveness and efficiency of

our algorithm through an implementation based on the MAGMA library [88, 90].
Experiments show that our algorithm has a low overhead of 0.354% at matrix size
about 10000. The overhead exhibits a decreasing trend as the matrix size increases.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 reviews related work.
Section 6.3 introduces the block bidiagonal reduction algorithm as implemented in the
MAGMA project. Section 6.4 discusses the soft error propagation pattern. Section 6.5
explains our fault tolerant algorithm. Section 6.6 reports the experimental results.
Finally, section 6.7 presents our conclusions.

6.2

Related Work

Research and reports about the existence and impact of soft errors on GPUs show
that soft errors are a real problem for scientific applications [52, 84, 86, 77]. There
are efforts to tolerate these errors using both software-based approaches [67, 66, 30]
and hardware-based approaches [83, 87].
Du et al. [40] proposed a soft error resilient QR factorization algorithm using a
post processing approach. In their scheme, the input matrix is encoded with two
extra checksum columns. These two extra columns are maintained as the regular QR
factorization proceeds. After the factorization has finished, the two extra columns
are used to detect the existence of a soft error and locate the column index where the
error occurred. The error is then projected to a rank-1 perturbation of the original
input matrix. Then the correct factorization result is obtained using the QR update
technique [47]. This post-processing scheme can successfully tolerate, at most, one
soft error, no matter what point in time the error has occurred.
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Kim et al. [60] designed a general scheme for fault tolerant matrix operations
including matrix multiplication, Cholesky factorization, LU factorization, QR factorization, and Hessenberg reduction. This scheme tackles hard errors (process failures).
The method uses a checksum to encode the input matrix, and the checksum is
generated at certain intervals and serves as a checkpoint of the application state.
In the case of a hard error, a roll back is performed to bring the program data back
to the state at which the last checksum was generated.
The MAGMA project [88] is an effort to take advantage of the latest development
of GPU accelerators to boost the performance of linear algebra operations. The
project redesigned the block algorithms in LAPACK [1] to better suit GPU-enabled
hybrid platforms. The methodology is called hybridization, by which computational
tasks are split according to their characteristics and scheduled to the CPUs and
GPUs accordingly. The magma dgebrd routine in MAGMA implements the hybrid
block bidiagonal reduction algorithm.

6.3

Block Bidiagonal Reduction in MAGMA

In order to understand our bidiagonal reduction algorithm with fault tolerant features,
it is essential to understand the non-fault tolerant algorithm first. In this section, we
describe the standard block bidiagonal reduction algorithm.
Suppose A is an M × N matrix, the block algorithm logically partitions A into
M × nb block columns and nb × N block rows. The reduction is an iterative process,
whereby every iteration reduces the leftmost nb matrix columns and the uppermost
nb matrix rows into the bidiagonal form. In every iteration, the following operation
is performed on the unreduced trailing matrix [34, 27]:
A(i+1) = A(i) − V Y > − XU >
where A(i) is the unreduced trailing matrix at the beginning of the i-th iteration,
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and A(i+1) is the resulting matrix of the i-th iteration (also the input for the (i + 1)th iteration). V is an M × nb matrix which consists of the Householder vectors
to annihilate columns of A; this matrix is used to update the trailing matrix from
the left. U is the matrix used to transform the input matrix from the right; this
matrix contains the Householder vectors used to annihilate rows of A. Y and X are
intermediate matrices, and each of them is generated through an iterative process.
Denoting the k-th column of Y as yk , the k-th column of X as xk , the calculation of
Y and X are given by [34, 27]:
>

yk+1 = τvk+1 (A(i) vk+1 − Yk Vk> vk+1 − Uk Xk> vk+1 )
>
xk+1 = τuk+1 (A(i) uk+1 − Xk Uk> uk+1 − Vk+1 Yk+1
uk+1 )

In MAGMA, the bidiagonal reduction routine for a double precision real matrix
is magma dgehrd. In every iteration, the algorithm performs the following operations:
1. Call magma dlahrd gpu. This call reduces the i-th block column and the i-th
block row of A to bidiagonal form, and generates V , U , X, and Y . The two
largest tasks in this routine (two GEMVs) are offloaded to the GPU.
2. Call magma dgemm to compute A = A − V Y > . This matrix-matrix multiply and
the following one are offloaded to the GPU.
3. Call magma dgemm to compute A = A − XU >
Figure 6.1 shows one iteration of the magma dgehrd routine.

6.4

Error Propagation

In this work we target soft errors specifically (as opposed to hard errors). A single bit
flip is sufficient to completely invalidate the factorization result. Figure 6.2 shows the
impact of a soft error in the course of the factorization. This example uses a 158×158
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DGEMM

(a) Beginning of iter- (b) Factorize
ation
panel

the

DGEMM

(c) A = A − V Y >

(d) A = A − XU >

(e) End of iteration

Figure 6.1: One iteration of magma dgebrd
matrix with the block size nb = 32. The soft error occurs in the second iteration at
location (72, 79), which is marked by a cross in Figure 6.2(a). Figure 6.2(b) shows
the heat map of the difference matrix between the correct factorization result and the
factorization result affected by one soft error. Black color indicates that the difference
is 0, and any other color indicates a difference of a magnitude proportionate to the
color. We can observe that the rectangular matrix at the bottom right corner contains
wrong values.
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Figure 6.2: Propagation pattern of an error.
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6.5

Fault Tolerant DGEBRD

In this section, we describe the fault tolerant bidiagonal reduction algorithm. The
algorithm is inspired by the ABFT concept [54]. The basic idea is to add redundant
information to the original data. A soft error means that some information in the
original matrix is corrupted. After the detection of the soft error, the algorithm uses
the redundancy to recover the corrupted information. The redundant information of
the input matrix is provided by a checksum column and a checksum row. Algorithm 11
shows the details of our approach.
Algorithm 11 Fault Tolerant Hybrid Bidiagonal Reduction
1: Transfer matrix: A on the host → d A on the GPU
2: Encode the input matrix, expand it with a checksum column and a checksum
row.
N
3: for i from 1 to d nb
e do
4:
Transfer the leftmost nb columns and uppermost nb rows of the trailing matrix
to the host.
5:
FT MAGMA DLABRD GPU, return V, U, X and Y
6:
Compute Xce , Yce , Vce , Uce
7:
DGEMM: Afe = Afe − Vce Yce>
>
8:
DGEMM: Afe P
= Afe − Xce Uce
P
9:
Compute Sre =
Are (i) and Sce =
Ace (i)
10:
if |Sre − Sce | > threshold then
11:
Reverse the last left update and right update.
Afe = Afe + Vce Yce>
>
Afe = Afe + Xce Uce
12:
Correct the error
13:
end if
14: end for

Algorithm 12 Locate(i, j, k)
1:
2:
3:
4:

DGEMV: Âchk r = Atrail · e
IF
DGEMV: Âchk r = Atrail · e>
IF
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Algorithm 13 Recover(i, j, k)
1: Set A(i, j) to 0.
PM
2: Compute Snew =
i=k+1 A(i, j)
3: Â(i, j) = Ace (j) − Snew

6.5.1

Data Redundancy

The algorithm first encodes the input matrix with both row checksums and column
checksums. The row checksums form a column vector which is appended to the right
of the matrix, the column checksums form a row vector which is appended to the
bottom of the input matrix. This task is accomplished in line 2. The algorithm
enters the main loop in line 3. In every iteration, the next panel is transferred to
the CPU to be factorized there (in Line 5). The original magma dlabrd gpu routine
only computes part of X and part of Y . Assuming the trailing matrix is of size
m × n, we only need the lower n × nb part of Y and the lower m × nb part of X
are needed to update the trailing matrix. In our fault tolerant algorithm, we need
the entire X and Y to calculate their respective column checksums, so we modified
the magma dlabrd gpu routine to compute the complete X and Y . The new routine
is named ft magma dlabrd gpu. Line 7 and line 8 update the trailing matrix. The
row checksums and column checksums are also updated together with the trailing
matrix. After the update, the row checksums remain to be the row checksums of their
corresponding rows. The column checksums remain to be the column checksums of
their corresponding columns. In other words, the checksum relationship is preserved
throughout the algorithm.

6.5.2

Error Detection

Line 9 and line 10 carry out error detection. Error detection is achieved by comparing
the sum of the row checksums of the trailing matrix and the sum of the column
checksums of the trailing matrix. Because both checksum vectors protect the same
matrix data (the trailing matrix), their sums should be equal to each other. If the
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difference is higher than a certain threshold, we consider an error has occurred. The
comparison of the two sums is performed in line 10.

6.5.3

Error Location and Correction

If an error is detected at line 10, the algorithm initiates the procedure to locate and
correct the error. To achieve this, the algorithm first performs a reverse update on the
trailing matrix. This is accomplished in line 11. The reverse update brings the trailing
matrix back to the state at the beginning of the erroneous iteration. At this point,
the error only exists in one matrix entry, the contamination to other matrix entries
is reversed, and now we have the correct row checksums and column checksums. The
error location works as follows. We compute the new row checksums and column
checksums of the actual trailing matrix, and these new checksums will encode the
erroneous value. Moreover, there will be exactly one row checksum which differs from
its corresponding old row checksum, and there will be exactly one column checksum
which differs from its corresponding column checksum. The row index and column
index of the error can be identified by comparing the new checksums and the old
checksums.
Once the error location (i, j) has been determined, we can use the row checksums
and the column checksums as devices to recover the lost matrix element. First we set
A(i, j) to zero, then we compute the checksum chkr for the i-th row. The lost matrix
element can be recovered by A(i, j) = chkr − old chkr . old chkr is the row checksum
of the i-th row which the algorithm maintains since the beginning of the factorization.
The algorithm resumes its normal operations after the recovery. It continues to detect,
locate, and correct errors in subsequent iteration until the factorization completes.

6.5.4

Multiple Concurrent Errors

In previous subsections, we only considered the case in which only one soft error
happens in an iteration. In fact the fault tolerant algorithm can deal with more than
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one soft errors in one iteration. When more than one soft error occurs, the entire
trailing matrix will be contaminated as in the one-error case, so the existence of errors
can always be detected. Similar to the analysis by Huang et al. [54], when the faulty
elements form a rectangle, these four errors cannot be located. Other than such a
situation, multiple errors can be located and then corrected.

6.5.5

Range of Application

The fault tolerant algorithm stated above is for bit-flips in the data matrix. The
fault tolerant algorithm does not deal with soft errors in the control logic.

It

does not consider persistent errors either. Persistent errors are usually caused by
malfunctioning hardware, this type of errors are outside of the range range covered
by this work.

6.6

Experiment Results

In this section, we present performance results of our fault tolerant bidiagonal
reduction algorithm.
The test platform we use is a machine at the University of Tennessee. This machine
has an Intel Xeon E5-2670 processor with a clock frequency of 2.6 GHz. It features
an NVIDIA Tesla K20c GPU (known also as Kepler) with the clock frequency of
the GPU at 705.5 MHz and the on-board memory of the GPU of 4799.6 MB. Te
machine has 62 GB of main memory. The operating system is Red Hat 4.4.6-4 and
the compiler is GCC 4.4.6 and NVCC 5.0 V0.2.1221.
Figure 6.3 shows the comparison of the performance of the fault tolerant bidiagonal
reduction and the performance of the MAGMA bidiagonal reduction. Figure 6.3(a)
shows the performance comparison when the fault tolerant bidiagonal reduction
suffers from one soft error. The error is injected in the third iteration in the panel
area. This is nearly the worst case scenario. The earlier the error occurs, the higher
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the cost of locating and correcting the error. The reason is that if the error occurs in
the early iterations of the factorization, we need to reverse the update of the trailing
matrix once we detect an error, and the trailing matrix is large in early iterations.
To locate the error, we need two DGEMV operations on the trailing matrix. In early
iterations the large trailing matrix also incurs higher costs in these two DGEMVs.
Figure 6.3(b) shows the performance comparison when the FT bidiagonal
reduction does not experience any errors. We can see that the performance overhead
also drops when the matrix size increases.
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Figure 6.3: Performance of the FT-BRD

6.7

Conclusion

In this chapter, we showed a design, implementation, and a performance evaluation of
a hybrid bidiagonal reduction algorithm based on the MAGMA framework equipped
with fault tolerant features.

Our fault tolerant bidiagonal reduction algorithm

employs reverse computation and algorithm-based fault tolerance to detect, locate,
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and correct soft errors in the bidiagonal reduction on CPU-GPU hybrid architectures.
Experimental results show that the performance overhead of our fault tolerant
algorithm is very low when the matrix size is small, and the performance overhead as
fraction of the overall computation time continues to drop as the matrix size increases.
At matrix sizes of about 10000, the overhead decreases to 1.085% when one soft error
occurs, and to 0.354% when no errors occur.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Directions
7.1

Conclusion

This research studied the algorithmic properties of two-sided dense matrix factorizations — namely the Hessenberg reduction, the tridiagonal reduction, the bidiagonal
reduction — and designed algorithm based fault tolerance algorithms for these dense
matrix reduction algorithms to provide resilience against hard errors and soft errors.
Theoretical analysis and experimental results both prove that our fault tolerant
algorithms are able to protect the factorizations against errors, are low-cost and are
scalable. We also showed that our fault tolerant algorithms do not degrade the
numerical stability of the original non-fault tolerant algorithms.
The major difficulty in designing fault tolerant algorithms for two-sided dense
matrix factorizations is finding a way to properly maintain the checksums.

In

the one-sided dense matrix factorization algorithms, the ABFT version of those
algorithms only needs to extend the normal trailing matrix update operations to
include the checksums. Then the checksums will be automatically updated to the
correct checksums of the updated trailing matrix. Whereas in two-sided dense matrix
factorizations, the trailing matrix is updated from both the right side and the left
side. The left side update destroys the checksums that are appended to the right side
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of the original matrix data. In order to perform the left side update to the trailing
matrix without destroying the checksums, we calculate a set of column checksums
for the block column resulting from the panel factorization. On distributed memory
machines, this checksum calculation involves an MPI reduction operation on one
process column in the process grid, and is carried out once in every iterative cycle of
the algorithm. Since MPI reduction operations are costly, a big portion of the time
overhead of our ABFT algorithm is spent on this repetitive checksum calculation.
On shared memory machines, we modified the panel factorization routine so that the
column checksum calculation is fused with the panel factorization. No observable
overhead is shown due to the checksum calculation for the block column resulting
from the panel factorization.
For the fault tolerant parallel tridiagonal reduction algorithm, we take advantage
of the symmetry of the matrix to retrieve data blocks from the lower triangular part
of the matrix when needed. In the ScaLAPACK implementation of the tridiagonal
reduction algorithm, only the lower triangular part of the matrix is accessed and
updated. This is done to save floating point operations. But in order to be able to
update the checksums in our ABFT algorithm, we choose to let the checksum blocks
on the right side of the matrix encode the full matrix instead of only encoding the
lower triangular matrix. When recovering from a failure, we need all matrix blocks
on the block row where the failure strikes, but the matrix blocks residing in the upper
triangular part are invalid. Since the matrix is symmetric, we can find the locations
of the corresponding data blocks in the lower triangular part and retrieve data from
there.
For the fault tolerant algorithms on CPU-GPU hybrid platforms, we use a row of
column checksums and a column of row checksums to protect the matrix. At the end
of each iterative cycle of the algorithm, we compute the sum of the row of checksums
and the sum of the column of checksums. By comparing the equality of the two sums,
we can detect if errors have occurred. If errors are detected, we reverse the trailing
matrix updates performed in this iterative cycle, and the state of the matrix is rolled
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back to the end of the previous iterative cycle. Now, the errors can be located and
corrected using the row of checksums and the column of checksums.

7.2

Future Directions

This research addresses hard errors in the parallel Hessenberg reduction algorithm
and the parallel tridiagonal reduction algorithm. This work also addresses soft errors
in the Hessenberg reduction algorithm and the bidiagonal reduction algorithms on
CPU-GPU hybrid algorithms. If supercomputer development continues according to
current trends, then future exascale machines will be composed of compute nodes with
both general purpose CPUs and special purpose accelerators. That is, each compute
node will have a number of CPUs and a number of accelerators. Fault tolerant
algorithms for dense matrix factorizations which utilize both CPUs and accelerators
are a necessary future research topic.
In this work, every fault tolerant algorithm deals with a single type of error, either
hard errors or soft errors. When errors strike, there is no guarantee that only one
type of error will occur. So our future plan includes integrating protection against
both hard errors and soft errors for two sided dense matrix factorization algorithms
running on distributed memory machines.
In our fault tolerant algorithms, the checksums are generated using a simple
addition operation.

When the matrix values are too big, the checksums may

overflow. When the difference between the values of matrix elements is large, the
numerical stability of the factorization algorithms may be severely degraded. A more
proper approach is to examine the matrix elements before generating the checksums.
Choosing a properly crafted generation matrix to generate the checksums will obtain
better numerical stability after the fault tolerant algorithms recover from errors. This
will be one other direction of our future work.
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